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FOREWORD
Many organizations today proclaim that safety is a company value. Though this 
kind of statement generates little disagreement, its practical implications for deci-
sion-making, allocation of resources, the organization of work and the concrete pro-
duction of safety at the sharp end of operations are not very clear. How do different 
categories of managers and workers understand the meaning of safety as a value? 
If the principle of “safety as a core value” sometimes conflicts with “generating val-
ue for shareholders”, how is this value conflict managed? What are the implications 
for safety management, both at a strategic level and for the wellbeing of people in 
the workplace?
The VALOSA research project aims to explore these important issues and provide a 
better understanding of the practical implications of safety as a value brings togeth-
er researchers from the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health (FIOH) and from 
TNO (the Netherlands). It was funded by the Finnish Work Environment Fund (FWEF) 
and the Foundation for an Industrial Safety Culture (FonCSI) in the context of the 
SAF€RA ERA-NET’s 2013 joint call for proposals on “The value of safety and safety 
values”. 
Eric Marsden (FonCSI) and Kenneth Johansson (FWEF)
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ABSTRACT
Many companies describe safety as their top priority, but does that mean that safe-
ty is a value for them? In the last few years, it has been increasingly acknowledged in 
safety research that value-based management commitment and the economic per-
spective are of crucial importance to safety performance. However, little research has 
been performed on the value of safety, confusion surrounds the definition and im-
pact of safety values, and no evidence-based methodologies exist for supporting, 
promoting and sharing safety values. 
The research presented in this report provides answers to these questions: Do indi-
viduals perceive safety as a value (a deeply held principle or guiding philosophy), or 
only as a priority (an important element among others to be integrated into their ar-
bitration between competing goals)? Do they believe that their employer treats safe-
ty as an (intrinsic) value, or as an (instrumental) goal, worth pursuing because it re-
duces losses and can impact on productivity?
Value is a criterion people use, often implicitly, to select and justify actions and to 
evaluate people and events. Values are operating philosophies or principles that 
guide an organization’s internal conduct as well as its relationship with the external 
world. They have a major influence on the behaviour of individuals and teams and 
serve as broad guidelines in all situations. Values are more stable and can be expect-
ed to have a more sustainable impact on safety than safety as “just a priority”. In this 
project, safety values and other supporting values for safety are addressed in the 
context of business strategy, corporate identity and corporate social responsibility. 
Safety values are important because they underlie any safety culture. Particularly in 
an era of deregulation, globalization, economic downturn and the ‘changing world 
of work’, values and culture are more stable than management systems or priori-
ties. Such values are also a component of firms’ Corporate Social Responsibility pro-
grammes. CEOs and production managers play a key role in safety management and 
safety promotion in their organization. Their commitment ultimately depends on 
their values and those of the organization, and of its key stakeholders. On this level 
in particular, there is often an imbalance between safety values and business values, 
leading to dilemmas and unsafe situations. By exploring safety values and dilemmas, 
this report provides insights into more successful mechanisms that have the poten-
tial to strengthen and promote safety values. The ultimate goal is to embed safety 
values in the values and strategies of the company.
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In this study, the first objective was to develop a common understanding of how safe-
ty as a value is defined by a variety of key stakeholders — CEOs/managers, employ-
ee representatives, safety experts and researchers. The second objective was to study 
what dilemmas or bottlenecks must be taken into account when practicing safety 
values, how organizations can effectively deal with them, and effective ways to pro-
mote safety through communicating while sharing safety as an organizational value. 
We first conducted a descriptive literature review, in order to provide information on 
the general background and context safety values, to define the safety value, and to 
explore value perspectives. Based on the literature, we developed an interview meth-
od and carried out seventeen interviews with senior managers in 15 organizations 
from five European countries (Finland, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain and Tur-
key), to obtain practice-based information on safety values and their impact on an 
organization’s functions. Next, we conducted a Delphi study, to develop a common 
understanding of how safety as a value is defined by a variety of key stakeholders, 
e.g. what it means when safety is an organizational value, what value safety has for 
organizations, what are the most relevant factors that influence the value of safety, 
what factors are expressions of having safety as a value and can be used to recog-
nize or perhaps measure safety as a value, as well as the ethical justification for “hav-
ing safety as an organizational value”. Finally, we used group interviews and surveys 
in three Finnish companies to study how safety is valued by different organization-
al groups, what kinds of value conflicts emerge in everyday work, decision-making 
and value communication, how organizations promote and share safety as a value in 
practice, and what factors within companies and organizations can strengthen safe-
ty as a value.
The literature review revealed that no clear and broadly accepted definition of the 
value of safety or safety values yet exists. The value of safety is often implicitly asso-
ciated with the importance associated with safety in an organization. However, Safe-
ty as a value” goes beyond “safety as a priority”. Organizational values have a more 
strategic impact than mere priorities. The senior manager interviews showed that, al-
though the corporate values were defined, safety was not always mentioned as a core 
value. Safety was viewed as being so embedded in the core business that it was not 
regarded as necessary to include safety explicitly in the company’s core values. The 
core values also correspond to the interviewed CEO’s/manager’s own personal val-
ues. The background and motives for safety were based on the view that safety is a 
necessity, a built-in part of business. The importance of safety was also partly based 
on the demands of the authorities or customer and of the surrounding society. On 
the other hand, such reasons were mentioned as secondary motivations for safety. 
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The result of our Delphi study is a consensus among the experts/stakeholders par-
ticipating in the study about what it means when safety is an organizational value. 
On the basis of the results, we propose that having safety as an organizational value 
can be defined as ‘a long-term commitment to having safety integrated as a posi-
tive value within all business operations and strategies’. When safety is genuinely an 
organizational value, this implies that the organization has a shared intrinsic motiva-
tion to strengthen safety.
Our survey concerning valuing safety at work revealed that, although safety is of-
ten considered a core value within organizations, the motivation for safety still lies in 
avoiding negative outcomes, i.e. financial sanctions. As regards valuing safety, there is 
a tendency to think – wrongly – that an individual’s unsafe behaviour is mainly the re-
sult of his/her bad personal values and attitudes concerning safety. Instead, we need 
to understand that most safety behaviour at work results from how people experi-
ence that safety is (or is not) valued, communicated, rewarded, directed, demanded 
and managed within their organizations. Our survey confirmed that employees’ val-
ues regarding safety are mainly influenced by organizational and managerial factors. 
This study revealed the importance of safety communication and the role of supervi-
sors in encouraging safe work, and the interviews support these results. Strengthen-
ing safety as a value requires cooperation on safety issues between management and 
employees. Based on our study, different managerial practices can be recommended 
in order to manage and promote safety as an organizational value.
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TIIVISTELMÄ
Monet yritykset kertovat turvallisuuden olevan niille ensiarvoisen tärkeää, mutta 
tarkoittaako se, että turvallisuus on niille arvo? Viime vuosina tehdyissä turvallisuus-
tutkimuksissa on yhä useammin todettu, että arvoperusteisilla johdon sitoutumisel-
la ja taloudellisilla näkökulmilla on ratkaiseva vaikutus turvallisuuteen. Turvallisuuden 
arvoa on kuitenkin tutkittu vain vähän, ja turvallisuusarvojen määritelmästä ja vaiku-
tuksista on epäselvyyttä. Turvallisuusarvojen tukemiseen, edistämiseen ja levittämi-
seen liittyviä näyttöön perustuvia menetelmiä ei ole.
Tässä raportissa esiteltävä tutkimus antaa vastauksia näihin kysymyksiin: Pitävätkö 
yksilöt turvallisuutta arvona (syvälle juurtunut periaate tai ohjaava ajattelutapa) vai 
ainoastaan prioriteettina (yksi monista tärkeistä tekijöistä, joka on sovitettava yh- 
teen kilpailevien tavoitteiden kanssa)? Kokevatko he, että heidän työnantajansa 
pitää turvallisuutta (sisäisenä) arvona vai (välineellisenä) tavoitteena, johon kannat-
taa pyrkiä, koska se vähentää tappioita ja voi vaikuttaa tuottavuuteen?
Arvo on kriteeri, jota ihmiset käyttävät – usein epäsuorasti – valitessaan ja perustelles-
saan toimiaan sekä arvioidessaan ihmisiä ja tapahtumia. Arvot ovat toiminnan taus-
talla olevia ajattelutapoja tai periaatteita, jotka ohjaavat organisaation sisäisiä me- 
nettelytapoja ja sen suhteita ulkomaailmaan. Niillä on merkittävä vaikutus yksilöid-
en ja ryhmien käyttäytymiseen, ja ne toimivat yleisinä suuntaviivoina kaikissa tilan-
teissa. Arvot ovat vakaampia, ja niillä voidaan olettaa olevan kestävämpiä vaikutuksia 
turvallisuuteen kuin silloin, jos on turvallisuus on ”vain prioriteetti”. Tässä raportissa 
tarkastellaan turvallisuusarvoja ja turvallisuutta tukevia muita arvoja liiketoimintas-
trategian, yrityskuvan ja yrityksen yhteiskuntavastuun yhteydessä. 
Turvallisuusarvot ovat tärkeitä, koska ne ovat kaiken turvallisuuskulttuurin pohjana. 
Etenkin sääntelyn purkamisen, globalisaation, taloudellisen taantuman ja muuttuvan 
työelämän aikakautena arvot ja kulttuuri ovat vakaampia kuin johtamisjärjestelmät 
tai prioriteetit. Tällaiset arvot sisältyvät myös yritysten yhteiskuntavastuuohjelmiin. 
Toimitusjohtajilla ja tuotantopäälliköillä on keskeinen osa organisaationsa turval-
lisuusjohtamisessa ja turvallisuuden edistämisessä. Heidän sitoutumisensa riippuu 
viime kädessä heidän arvoistaan sekä organisaation ja sen keskeisten sidosryhmien 
arvoista. Varsinkin tällä tasolla turvallisuusarvot ja liiketoiminnan arvot ovat usein 
epätasapainossa, mikä johtaa ongelmiin ja vaarallisiin tilanteisiin. Tarkastelemal-
la turvallisuusarvoja ja ongelmia tämä raportti antaa kuvan mekanismeista, joiden 
avulla on mahdollista tuloksellisemmin vahvistaa ja edistää turvallisuusarvoja. Viime 
kädessä tavoitteena on sisällyttää turvallisuusarvot yrityksen arvoihin ja strategioihin.
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Tämän tutkimuksen ensimmäisenä tavoitteena oli luoda yhteinen käsitys siitä, mi-
ten erilaiset keskeiset sidosryhmät – toimitusjohtajat/johtajat, henkilöstön edusta-
jat, turvallisuusasiantuntijat ja tutkijat – määrittelevät turvallisuuden arvona. Toise-
na tavoitteena oli selvittää, mitkä ongelmat tai pullonkaulat on otettava huomioon 
sovellettaessa turvallisuusarvoja käytäntöön, miten organisaatiot voivat ratkaista 
ne tehokkaasti sekä miten turvallisuutta voidaan edistää tehokkaasti viestimällä ja 
omaksumalla se organisaation arvoksi. 
Toteutimme ensin kuvailevan kirjallisuuskatsauksen, jonka tarkoituksena oli saada tie- 
toa turvallisuusarvojen yleisestä taustasta ja kontekstista, määritellä turvallisuusarvo 
ja tutkia arvonäkökulmia. Kirjallisuuden pohjalta kehitimme haastattelumenetelmän 
ja haastattelimme 17:ää ylemmän johdon edustajaa 15 organisaatiosta viidessä Eu-
roopan maassa (Suomi, Saksa, Iso-Britannia, Espanja ja Turkki). Haastattelujen tarko-
ituksena oli saada käytännön tietoa turvallisuusarvoista ja niiden vaikutuksesta or-
ganisaation toimintoihin. Sen jälkeen teimme Delfoi-tutkimuksen, jolla pyrimme 
luomaan yhteisen käsityksen siitä, miten erilaiset keskeiset sidosryhmät määrittelevät 
turvallisuuden arvona, esimerkiksi mitä turvallisuus organisaation arvona merkitsee, 
mitä arvoa turvallisuudella on organisaatioille, mitkä ovat tärkeimmät turvallisuuden 
arvoon vaikuttavat tekijät, mitkä tekijät ilmaisevat turvallisuutta arvona ja minkä teki-
jöiden avulla turvallisuus on tunnistettavissa arvoksi ja ehkä mitattavissa sellaisena 
sekä miten ”turvallisuutta organisaation arvona” perustellaan eettisesti. Lopuksi selvi- 
timme kolmessa suomalaisessa yrityksessä. tehtyjen ryhmähaastattelujen ja kyselyjen 
avulla, miten eri organisaatioryhmät arvostavat turvallisuutta, millaisia arvoristiriitoja 
syntyy päivittäisessä työssä, päätöksenteossa ja arvoviestinnässä, miten organisaati-
ot edistävät ja levittävät käytännössä turvallisuutta arvona sekä mitkä tekijät yrityk-
sissä ja organisaatioissa voivat vahvistaa turvallisuutta arvona.
Kirjallisuuskatsauksesta kävi ilmi, ettei turvallisuuden arvolle tai turvallisuusarvoil-
le ole vielä selkeää ja laajasti hyväksyttyä määritelmää. Turvallisuuden arvo liittyy 
usein epäsuorasti turvallisuuden tärkeyteen organisaatiossa. ”Turvallisuus arvona” 
ulottuu kuitenkin pidemmälle kuin ”turvallisuus prioriteettina”. Organisaation arvoil-
la on strategisempi vaikutus kuin pelkillä prioriteeteilla. Ylemmän johdon edustajien 
haastatteluista ilmeni, että vaikka yrityksen arvot oli määritelty, turvallisuutta ei aina 
mainittu ydinarvona. Turvallisuuden katsottiin kuuluvan niin tiiviisti ydinliiketoimin- 
taan, ettei sen nimenomaista sisällyttämistä yrityksen ydinarvoihin pidetty tarpeel-
lisena. Ydinarvot vastaavat myös haastateltujen toimitusjohtajien/johtajien henkilö-
kohtaisia arvoja. Turvallisuuden tausta ja perusteet pohjautuivat näkemykseen, jonka 
mukaan turvallisuus on välttämättömyys ja kiinteä osa liiketoimintaa. Turvallisuuden 
tärkeys perustui osittain myös viranomaisten tai asiakkaan ja ympäröivän yhteiskun-
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nan vaatimuksiin. Toisaalta tällaiset syyt mainittiin toissijaisina perusteluina turval-
lisuudelle. 
Delfoi-tutkimuksen tulos ilmentää tutkimukseen osallistuneiden asiantuntijoiden/si-
dosryhmien yhteistä näkemystä siitä, mitä turvallisuus organisaation arvona tarkoit-
taa. Tulosten perusteella ehdotamme, että turvallisuus organisaation arvona voitaisiin 
määritellä seuraavasti: ”pitkäaikainen sitoutuminen siihen, että turvallisuus sisällyte- 
tään myönteisenä arvona kaikkeen liiketoimintaan ja strategioihin”. Kun turvallisuus 
on aidosti organisaation arvo, sen perusteella voidaan päätellä, että organisaatiolla 
on yhteinen sisäinen motivaatio turvallisuuden vahvistamiseen.
Turvallisuuden arvostusta koskevasta kyselystä ilmeni, että vaikka turvallisuutta pi-
detään usein organisaatioiden ydinarvona, turvallisuuden perusteluna on edelleen 
kielteisten seurausten eli taloudellisten seuraamusten välttäminen. Turvallisuuden 
arvostukseen tai sen puutteeseen liittyen usein ajatellaan – virheellisesti –, että yk-
silön vaarallinen käyttäytyminen johtuu hänen kielteisistä henkilökohtaisista ar-
voistaan ja suhtautumisestaan turvallisuuteen. Sen sijaan olisi ymmärrettävä, et-
tä turvallisuuskäyttäytyminen työssä on useimmiten seurausta siitä, miten ihmisten 
mielestä heidän organisaatiossaan arvostetaan turvallisuutta, viestitään ja palkitaan 
turvallisuudesta sekä ohjataan, vaaditaan ja johdetaan turvallisuuden edistämistä (vai 
tapahtuuko näin ollenkaan). Kysely vahvisti, että työntekijöiden turvallisuutta kos- 
keviin arvoihin vaikuttavat pääasiassa organisatoriset ja johtamiseen liittyvät tekijät. 
Tästä tutkimuksesta kävi ilmi turvallisuusviestinnän merkitys ja esimiesten rooli turval-
lisen työskentelyn edistäjänä. Haastattelut tukevat näitä tuloksia. Turvallisuuden vah-
vistaminen arvona edellyttää johdon ja työntekijöiden yhteistyötä turvallisuusasio-
issa. Tämän tutkimuksen perusteella voidaan suositella erilaisia johtamiskäytäntöjä 
turvallisuuden johtamiseksi ja edistämiseksi organisaation arvona.
10
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I - Value of safety and safety as a value 13
1 Literature review on the Value of Safety and Safety as a Value  14
1.1 Aim 14
1.2 The concept of value  14
1.3 Safety as a value and the value of safety 17
1.4 Relations of value of safety to safety culture and climate 18
1.5 Safety-related supporting values 20
1.6 Mechanisms that form and strengthen organizational safety values 21
1.7 Impact of safety values on daily routines 22
1.8 Barriers for implementing safety-related values 23
1.9 Corporate social responsibility 24
1.10 Conclusions 27
2 Interviews with stakeholders 29
2.1 Objectives 29
2.2 Data 29
2.3 Method 29
2.4 Results 30
2.4.1 Corporate values 30
2.4.2 Background and motives for safety 30
2.4.3 Sharing values 31
2.4.4 Values in everyday work 32
2.5 Conclusions 33
3 Delphi study 35
3.1 Objectives 35
3.2 Data collected 35
3.3 Method 37
11
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
3.4 Analysis 40
3.5 Results 42
3.5.1 Safety as an organizational value 42
3.5.2 The value safety has for organizations 44
3.5.3 Influencing factors 45
3.5.4 Visibility in practice 47
3.5.5 Ethical justifications 49
3.6 Discussion 50
3.6.1 Safety as an organizational value 50
3.6.2 Value that safety has for organizations 50
3.6.3 Influencing factors 51
3.6.4 Visibility 52
3.6.5 Ethical justification of safety as a value 53
3.7 Conclusion 53
4 Discussion 56
4.1 Understanding safety as an organizational value and its value to organiza-
tions 56
4.2 Individual differences in perception of safety 58
4.3 Ways, challenges and solutions in practicing safety as a value 60
4.4 Zero accident vision and beyond 63
4.5 Limitations of the study 64
4.6 Recommendations for future research 65
PART II - Organizational values and valuing safety at work 66
5 Introduction 67
6 Interviews with supervisors and employees 69
6.1 Participants 69
6.2 Implementation of the group interviews 69
6.3 Main observations from the group interviews 69
12
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
7 “Organizational values and safety as a value” survey 71
7.1 Participants 71
7.2 Survey method 73
7.2.1 The content of the survey 73
7.2.2 Statistical methods 75
7.3 Findings and discussion 75
7.3.1 Dimensions for valuing safety 75
7.3.2 Values in life 77
7.3.3 Work-related values 79
7.3.4 How safety is valued in the organizations 79
7.3.5 Negative safety outcomes 85
7.4 Value conflicts and practical problems affecting safety in everyday work 87
7.5 Ways to improve safety at work 88
7.6 Experiencing an accident in one’s vicinity increases mistrust in safety as a value 
of the organization 90
7.7 Factors predicting that safety is valued by individuals 91
8 Safety as an organizational value – the main challenges and proposals 
for solutions 94
8.1 Beyond safety as an employee’s value 94
8.2 How to strengthen safety as a value? 95
8.3 Limitations 98
8.4 For future research 98
Literature 99
13
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
PART I - VALUE OF SAFETY AND SAFETY AS A VALUE
Value of Safety research project 
Research report of work packages WP1-WP3
Henriikka Ratilainen1 (Editor), Simo Salminen1, Gerard Zwetsloot2, Pia 
Perttula1, Annick Starren2, Wouter Steijn2, Krista Pahkin1, Linda Drup-
steen2, Vuokko Puro1, Tuula Räsänen1, Markku Aaltonen1, Frank Berkers2, 
Virpi Kalakoski1
1) Finnish Institute of Occupational Health (Finland)
2) TNO (The Netherlands)
Published on 2016-09-23 in SAF€RA technical report number 2016-01 
https://projects.safera.eu/project/8
14
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
1 LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE VALUE OF SAFETY 
AND SAFETY AS A VALUE 
1.1 Aim
The aim of the literature review was to review the scientific literature on the value 
of safety and safety as a value. Safety can be a value for organizations, for individu-
als (e.g. managers and workers) and for society at large. There are very few peer-re-
viewed scientific publications on the value of safety, other than on the economic val-
ue.  In fact, the value of safety and safety values are implicit in most safety research 
(as the aim is usually to somehow contribute to the improvement of safety). How-
ever, it is only very seldom explicitly addressed in the scientific literature. Therefore, 
we have also included some non-peer-reviewed publications in this literature review.
We first focus on the value of safety and safety as a value. Though there is not yet 
an accepted consensus on what safety as a value means, there is still some literature 
wherein practical issues with respect to safety values are mentioned. While it is like-
ly that the respective authors give different meanings to the concept of “the value 
of safety”, it seems nevertheless relevant to give an overview of the literature on the 
impact of safety values on daily routines, and on factors relevant for implementation. 
1.2 The concept of value 
Before focusing on value of safety and safety as a value, we need to briefly explore 
how values are understood in general, other than the monetary value of something. 
In Table 1.1 we have listed some common definitions from dictionaries and, in sum-
mary, there are two different definitions:
1.  value (especially in singular) is defined as the importance of something
2.  values (especially in plural) are defined as beliefs or principles that guide behav-
ior as well as judgements and decision making. 
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Table 1.1. Some definitions for value, values and core value(s).
Term        Definitions
value “Importance or worth of something for someone” (English - English Dic-
tionary 2015)
“The importance, worth, or usefulness of something” (Oxford dictionaries 
2016)
“One’s judgement of what is important in life” (Oxford dictionaries 2016)
values “[O]perating philosophies or principles that guide an organization’s in-
ternal conduct as well as its relationship with the external world.  Va-
lues provide guidance for people on what is good or desirable and what 
is not. They exert major influence on the behaviour of individuals and 
teams and serve as broad guide lines in all situations.”  (British Quality 
Foundation 2016)
“The beliefs people have, especially about what is right and wrong and 
what is most important in life, that control their behaviour” (Cambridge 
Dictionaries 2016)
“A principle or belief that a person or organization views as being of 
central importance” (Oxford dictionaries 2016)
“[O]perating philosophies or principles that guide an organization’s in-
ternal conduct as well as its relationship with the external world.  Va-
lues provide guidance for people on what is good or desirable and what 
is not. They exert major influence on the behaviour of individuals and 
teams and serve as broad guide lines in all situations.”  (British Quality 
Foundation 2016)
“Set of concepts and ideals that guide someone’s life and help them to 
make important decisions” (Collin 2009)
core value(s) “The main commercial and moral principles that influence the way an or-
ganization is run and the way it conducts its business, and that are sup-
posed to be shared by everyone in the organization from senior mana-
gement to ordinary employee” (Collin 2009)
“A principle that guides an organization’s internal conduct as well as its 
relationship with the external world. Core values are usually summarized 
in the mission statement or in a statement of core values.”  (BusinessDic-
tionary.com 2016)
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Rokeach (2000, p. 2) has described values as “core conceptions of the desirable within 
every individual and society”. On the other hand, Colley et al. (2013) defined values as 
beliefs regarding what is important, either for individuals, or for the organization as a 
whole. Meglino and Ravlin (1998) include also social learning in the definition when 
describing that values are a “constant set of core beliefs held by individuals concern-
ing how they should or ought to behave over a broad range of situations” which are 
difficult to change in adulthood, but can be modified during the socialization pro-
cesses experienced during life. Values are motivational elements (Meglino and Rav-
lin 1998). They give a reason to desire one alternative over another.
Schwartz (2012) lists six implicit main features of values. According to him, values are 
beliefs, refer to desirable goals, transcend specific actions and situations, serve as 
standards or criteria, and are ordered by importance.  Also, the relative importance of 
multiple values guides action.  These features concern all the values.  However, there 
are different motivations or needs underlying the values (e.g. needs for control, varie-
ty, pleasure etc.). Values can serve individual needs as well as needs that are important 
for group functioning. Keller et al. (1992) have shown in their work value study that 
40% of the variance in measured values of individuals was related to genetic factors, 
and 60% of the variance was associated with environmental factors and error variance. 
This means that the values of individual people can be influenced significantly by envi-
ronmental factors, but also that there are personality factors that cannot be influenced.
Paarlberg and Perry (2007) investigated the question “Can workplace values be man-
aged?”. They found out that strategic values are motivating for employees to the 
extent that they reflect employees’ internal affective, normative, and task-orient-
ed values; a zone of existing values. According to Paarlberg and Perry (2007), values 
management is a social process that results from routine interactions, however, for-
mal management systems provide opportunities to enhance the social interactions 
that are motivating to employees. They also described the process of aligning values 
being a social process that occurs through routine interactions between employees, 
managers, and even customers and other stakeholders, and the routine interactions 
that reinforce employees’ existing values. They pointed out that middle managers 
play key roles in interpreting strategic values in terms of employees’ values and em-
ployees’ everyday work responsibilities, as well as communicating and rewarding 
performance toward those values. The middle managers are acting as integrators, 
connecting employees’ individual values, derived from the societal, cultural, and re-
ligious experiences, with the organization’s strategic practices. Paarlberg and Perry 
(2007) concluded that values can be managed to a certain extent, but not completely.
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1.3 Safety as a value and the value of safety
There are many different definitions of values. However, when speaking about safe-
ty values, the number of definitions is more limited. There is no unanimously accept-
ed definition or mutual understanding of safety (at work) as a value. Already in 1948, 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated that “everyone has 
the right […] to just and favourable conditions of work”. In 1976, the United Nations 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights reaffirmed that the 
above mentioned statement covers “safe and healthy working conditions” (Alli 2008).
Cooper (2001) has stated that the idea of ‘safety is a value’ is based on the “funda-
mental philosophy that all injuries are preventable and that the goal of zero injuries 
can be achieved”. Zwetsloot et al. (2013b) call the “zero accident vision” the only ethi-
cally sustainable long-term goal for safety management. Values are learned from oth-
ers but after that strengthened and moulded by individual’s experiences and values 
can be changed through socialization. Organizations can set safety as a priority but 
that does not automatically include the value of safety, certainly not for all individu-
als. However, systematic and consistent prioritization of safety can be seen as a tool 
for sharing values and encouraging members of the organization to acquire them.
One can state that safety is a value in itself (Zwetsloot et al. 2013b). There is a good rea-
son to say that safety at work represents a value in itself. Safety certainly belongs to what 
most people judge to be important in life (which was part of one of the definitions of a 
value, given above) (Zwetsloot et al. 2013b). In their white paper on Injury and Illness Pre-
vention Programs (OSHA 2012), US OSHA quote the CEO of Parsons cooperation:
Establishing safety as a value rather than a priority tells our employees and our customers 
that safety is built into our culture, not something we do to merely comply with regulations.
The value of safety is expressed through the organization’s safety policies, practic-
es, and procedures (Sinclair et al. 2010). In safety-critical organizations, a framework 
supplied by value-focused thinking helps to understand decisions made by opera-
tors (Merrick et al. 2005). Safety values are defined by Newman and her co-workers 
(Newnam et al. 2012) as the importance associated with safety within an organization. 
According to Newnam et al., safety values are predictors of the safety information ex-
change between supervisors and employees. Newnam et al. (2008) concentrated on in-
trinsic value of safety, rather than extrinsic motivators, such as rewards and punishment.
Perceptions of workplace safety values are transmitted across levels of the organiza-
tion. Fu and Chan (2014) defined safety values at Taipei International Airport as safety 
practices which are implemented even under the pressure of competing tasks. Safe-
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ty is considered as a value and “having safety as a value” is a commonly encountered 
aspiration for organizations. For example, the Robert W. Campbell Award1 identifies 
safety as a value by recognizing organizations that “uphold EHS as a key business val-
ue and link measurable achievement in EHS performance to productivity and profit-
ability”. Since values are motivational elements (Meglino and Ravlin 1998) and they 
give a reason to desire one alternative over another, they give a great potential when 
trying to improve safety performance. However, this does not give us a definition or 
further insight into the value of safety, or safety as a value.
1.4 Relations of value of safety to safety culture and climate
Safety values are closely connected with organizational culture. As for safety values, 
there is no unanimously accepted definition of safety culture. Organizational culture 
is defined as shared values and beliefs that interact with company’s people, organ-
izational structures and control system to produce behavioural norms (Edwards et 
al. 2013). On the other hand, Guldenmund (2000) includes beliefs and values about 
work, people, the organization and the community that are shared by most mem-
bers within the organization as a part of organizational culture. 
According to Schein (1997, 2007), there are three levels of organizational culture: ba-
sic assumptions, espoused values, and artifacts. Basic assumptions are the core of an 
organizational culture, although they cannot be directly perceived. Espoused values 
are values and rules of behaviour stated by the organization, and they are often ex-
pressed in official philosophies and public statements of identity. The visible aspect 
of an organization’s culture is reflected in artifacts, which are identifiable and easy to 
measure, but it might be difficult to clarify their links with the underlying layers of the 
culture. The influence of the deeper layers of culture – the basic assumptions and val-
ues – on the members of the organization remains largely unconscious or even sub-
conscious (Hofstede et al. 2010; Schein 1997, 2007), and is transferred to new mem-
bers of the organization through implicit socialization processes. For a long-lasting 
safety improvement, a change in the organizational culture can be needed (Schein 
2007, 2009), by not only limiting the change to the artifacts or espoused theories, 
but also extending the changes to the ‘basic assumptions,’ which are assumed to in-
clude internalized values (Giddens 1991).
According to Schein (2010), culture can be best thought of as what a group has 
learned through- out its history in solving its problems of external survival and inter-
nal integration. Its core is the shared, tacit assumptions that have come to be taken 
1 Robert W. Campbell Award. (2015). Recognizing Business Excellence in Safety and Health. 
The Campbell Institute 2015. Available at campbellaward.org. [28 July 2015].
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for granted and that determine the members’ daily behaviour. These assumptions are 
stated as norms of behaviour or as the way things are done around here; how, for ex-
ample, safety issues are managed. 
Schein (2014) also points out that the way in which people view safety and how cul-
tural factors impact safety issues is also influenced by national cultures and, even 
more importantly, by occupational cultures.  In every organization there are subcul-
tures, which have their own subsets of assumptions on safety. For example, executives 
are concerned about the financial conditions, the designers are interested in process 
safety and the operators in coping with all the surprises of standardized operations 
(Schein 1996). These subcultures have their roots and origins in the occupations and 
professions, not merely inside the organization. There are also cultural variations of 
the occupations in different industries.
Safety culture concerns meanings, interpretations, attitudes, values, beliefs, rules and 
procedures related to safety (Díaz-Cabrera et al. 2007). Safety culture is seen as an or-
ganization’s ability and will to understand what safe operations are, what risks an or-
ganization’s activities involve, and how they can be prevented. It is also the ability and 
will to act safely, prevent the realization of risks, and to promote safety. Safety cul-
ture combines the experiences and perspectives of employees, the social phenomena 
of work communities, and organizations’ operational processes (Reiman et al. 2008).
According to Reason (1997), a characteristic of a positive safety culture is a “just cul-
ture”: an atmosphere of trust that encourages people to deliver OSH-relevant infor-
mation and where everybody knows what is acceptable and unacceptable behav-
iour. Justice and reliable information, even if it is bad news, generates credibility and 
confidence in safety management. Reason also emphasized the importance of in-
formedness and trust as values that are necessary elements of a good safety culture. 
The definitions of safety culture and safety climate often share the same words, illustrat-
ing the weak boundary between organizational climate and safety culture. Safety climate 
describes individual perceptions of the value of safety in the work environment (Neal et 
al. 2000). Organizational safety climate is a specific form of organizational climate, which 
denotes the shared perception of safety values, norms, beliefs, practices, and principles 
that workers have of their work environments (Gyekye et al. 2012; Gyekye and Salminen 
2009a,b). An anthropological view sees safety culture as a set of underlying beliefs, at-
titudes, values and assumptions shared by members of an organization (Edwards et al. 
2013).
In addition, Díaz-Cabrera  et  al.  (2007) found in the factor analysis of organizational safety 
climate a factor including the following values: values ruling fulfillment, values in sincerity 
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and participation, values of goal achievement, values in collaboration in goal achievement, 
values participating in safety promotion, values ruling observation, values contributing cre-
ative ideas, and values initiating in finding new solutions. Griffin and Neal (2000) developed 
a five-dimensional safety climate survey tool including a four-item scale about the degree 
to which managers were perceived to value safety in the workplace.
As stated by Amalberti (2015), “safety culture […] is often cited as the final step in 
achieving an optimal level of safety…” [nevertheless having the lowest priority in the 
total of optimizing processes in many cases, which makes its effect restricted by ear-
lier choices].  There can, however, be little doubt that (shared) values underlie also 
the decisions about technology, business opportunities, etc.
1.5 Safety-related supporting values
Dierdorf and Morgeson (2013) wrote that achievement (accomplishment and utilization 
of one’s abilities), independence (reinforcement and stimulation of initiative and creativi-
ty), altruism (fostering harmony and service to others), status (advancement, recognition 
and prestige), and comfort (supportive and free from stress) were safety-related values. 
On the other hand, Colley and Neal (2012) had identified 42 concepts across a series of 
interviews, which were indicators of the value and importance ascribed to safety.
Gregory et al. (2009) mentioned five culture domains, associated with competing values:
1. Group culture, which included belonging to the group, cohesiveness, partici-
patory decision making, and support from co-workers,
2. Development culture: flexibility and adaptation
3. Rational culture considering goal attainment, productivity, achievement and 
competition
4. Hierarchical culture: internally focused control, job security
5. Balanced culture including values associated with each domain are strongly held.
The basic values of security cover an emphasis on safety, harmony, and stability (Hystad 
and Bye 2013).
In the book of Townsend (2013) there is attention to safety values and beliefs.  He 
analyses the values and beliefs of 11 companies and the UK Health and Safety Execu-
tive (HSE), based on the companies’ CSR reports and a HSE report. Based on the idea 
that a value is what is important to the organization, he regards statements like “inju-
ries are unacceptable” as a value. As a follow-up, Townsend analyses how consistently 
they then translate these values into “key themes and concepts” i.e. commitment, au-
dits, worker/staff behaviour, competency, communication, skills, ability and proficien-
cy, shared values and attitudes, motivation, and mutual trust and reciprocal dialogue.
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Zwetsloot et al. (2013b) identified twenty-nine values and value related factors that are 
described in the literature as supportive to Health, Safety and Well-being at Work. These 
were clustered around seven core values. These seven core values were then grouped in 
three value clusters. The first value cluster is characterized by a positive attitude toward 
people and their ‘being’; it comprises the core values of interconnectedness, participa-
tion and trust. The second value cluster is relevant for the organizational and individual 
‘doing’, for actions planned or undertaken, and comprises justice and responsibility. The 
third value cluster is relevant for ‘becoming’ and is characterized by the alignment of per-
sonal and organizational development; it comprises the values of growth and resilience.
1.6 Mechanisms that form and strengthen organizational 
safety values
Values can be conveyed through organizational socialization, when leaders set the val-
ues of the organization and propagate them to employees. This requires that values 
serve some kind of function for the individual or they must be presented as the only 
possible interpretation of the situation (Meglino and Ravlin 1998). Some mechanisms 
have been found that strengthen safety values. For example, supervisor safety prac-
tices are associated with stronger safety values, and drivers were motivated to drive 
safely if they perceived that both their supervisors and the fleet manager value safety.
Management tend to be associated with global policies and safety culture, and so influ-
ence safety at an industry level. On the other hand, supervisors and workmates influence 
safety climate and group values and thus showed a greater influence on local safety per-
formance. At the shop-floor level, the guidelines and values are modified or reinterpreted. 
Level of trust in workmates was the strongest predictor of involvement in near-miss anal-
ysis (Conchie and Donald 2006). Trust/mistrust attitudes towards management were iden-
tified as the strongest influence on safety performance (Conchie and Donald 2006). Trust 
is a necessary condition for the spread of safety values (compare with Reason 1997). Well-
aligned words and actions send clear signals to employees that appropriate safety behav-
iour will be rewarded and inappropriate safety behaviour will be sanctioned.
Trade unions make workplace safety a high priority in contract bargaining. Safety motiva-
tion was related to the union and supervisor safety values, but safety knowledge was not re-
lated to safety values (Sinclair et al. 2010). When seafarers had high levels of hardiness, per-
sonal values had no effect on safety behaviour. On the other hand, when hardiness was low, 
conservation values (security) seemed to increase safety behaviour (Hystad and Bye 2013).
In learning from accidents, Saleh and Pendley (2012) used the concept of safety value 
chain. It identifies those who contribute to accident prevention and sustaining sys-
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tem safety. It also highlights the agencies influencing and contributing to accident 
prevention and system safety. The safety value chain includes operators, technicians, 
engineers, system designers, managers and executives, shareholders, regulator rep-
resentatives, safety inspectors, and accident investigators (Saleh and Pendley 2012). 
Gregory et al. (2009) listed managers’ support, empowerment, mentoring and sup-
porting teamwork as ways to improve safety values. 
1.7 Impact of safety values on daily routines
It is known that CEOs and production managers play a key role in safety management 
and safety promotion in their organization. Their commitment depends ultimately on 
their values and those of the organization, and of its key stakeholders.
Safety and environmental matters are the first on the agenda, said an English CEO 
(Karr 1999). When managers espouse safety values in their speeches, employees per-
ceive the leader’s concern for safety as more genuine, and are therefore more like-
ly to speak about safety issues (Halbesleben et al. 2013). Responsibility of Australi-
an fleet managers in safety management could be acknowledged more formally, in 
order to strengthen the fleet manager’s role to ensure the organizational approach 
to fleet safety. They also provide feedback to drivers on their safety performance in 
a work vehicle (Newnam et al. 2008). A supervisor who values safety is more likely to 
be committed to prioritizing safety within their work role tasks, and this tendency is 
consistent with their safety actions (Newnam et al. 2012).  88% of British senior di-
rectors indicated that employee morale and company reputation would be adverse-
ly affected by a poor health and safety culture (Smallman and John 2001).
In their study, Colley and Neal (2012) found that corporate values were more central 
to supervisors’ schema than to senior managers’ schema. Corporate values play an 
important role for supervisors in the way that they approach and deal with safety.  Is-
sues relating to the work environment, e.g. trade-off between safety and productiv-
ity are more central for senior managers than for supervisors.
When workers perceive their organization to be supportive, they also perceive management 
as valuing their safety (Salminen et al. 2013). Older workers had the best perceptions of safe-
ty, management’s concern for workers’ safety, and efficacy of safety programmes in place at 
the worksite (Gyekye and Salminen 2009a). Workers who perceived organizational support as 
relatively high considered their company’s safety programmes worthwhile, good, useful, first-
rate, and important more often than other workers (Gyekye and Salminen 2007).
Values influence employee perception of safety (Colley et al. 2013). Blue collar work-
ers valued safe surroundings more than top managers in a large Finnish metal fac-
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tory (Salminen and Koivula 2006). Trade unions’ safety values influence safety out-
comes through its association with higher safety motivation, showing a similar effect 
to that of supervisors’ safety values (Sinclair et al. 2010). American contractors should 
emphasize organizational safety values to new workers during the selection process 
(Lai et al. 2011). Seafarers with a stronger emphasis on conservation values reported 
a higher level of safe behaviours (Hystad and Bye 2013). 
Safety values are also important among American college students. They predicted 
safety practices among students. Female students were found to be more conscious 
about safety values than male students (Crowe 1995). In an American hospital, group 
culture and balanced cultures (with values necessary to operate in all four quadrants) 
achieve higher levels of patient satisfaction (Gregory et al. 2009).
Safety values are also included in questionnaires used at workplaces. For example, a 
social capital questionnaire includes items like feelings of safety and value of life and 
social agency (Kritsotakis et al. 2011). A balanced cultural profile is associated with 
better safety (Colley et al. 2013).
According to previous studies, we can say that a person’s status in the company con-
tributes to how they considered valuing safety affects daily routines. Top managers 
report that safety is at the top of agenda, and often it is held among the first issues 
in meetings. On the other hand, employees look at safety values in a more practical 
way concerning their personal safety.
1.8 Barriers for implementing safety-related values
Values cannot be easily implemented. It is relatively easy to espouse (safety) values, 
but “values have to be ‘lived’, by most individuals and be confirmed in social inter-
actions before they are really internalized as ‘shared values’” (Zwetsloot et al. 2013b) 
and become an integral part of the corporate culture. Implementing values therefore 
takes a lot of time, say 5-10 years. Nevertheless, such a long-term development can 
be regarded as implementing safety-related values.
Values set for the organization may lose their priority if an organization rewards value 
violation, or when individuals are forced to choose between conflicting values (Meg-
lino and Ravlin 1998). Few studies have been done concerning barriers for imple-
menting safety-related values. For example, managers in health care may be forced 
to espouse high safety values, without being able to follow-up on these expectations 
themselves. In addition, looking at only one indicator (e.g., frequency of injuries) may 
not represent the whole picture of safety (Halbesleben et al. 2013). In an Australian 
transportation fleet, it is uncertain whether senior-level managers had given super-
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visors directives on how to manage their fleet safely (Newnam et al. 2008).
(Colley and Neal 2012) argue that bottlenecks in transferring and reinforcing the 
safety message may occur because of the communication styles and differing values 
of supervisors. Managers are more likely to emphasize components of safety that 
are prominent in their individual mental representation of safety (such as corporate 
values and organizational safety priorities), and pay less attention to topics that are 
central to the representations of employees (e.g. practices, procedures, and training). 
Employees often do not share unified beliefs about the value of safety with managers.
Line managers have to manage the dual goals of productivity/efficiency and safety. If a 
productivity schema is more salient and important in the thinking of individual manag-
ers, they may over-emphasize productivity and under-emphasize safety. Information that 
is communicated to employees that is inconsistent with their existing schema may not 
be recalled as easily and may be given less attention or even ignored. When these rea-
sons are combined, it becomes important to develop and implement strategies to min-
imize miscommunication arising from misaligned safety schema (Colley and Neal 2012). 
Prevention of occupational injuries should be focused on concerns with safety and 
responsibility (Higgins 2002). The threat of work stoppages or grievances should in-
crease management awareness about safety concerns and increase the likelihood 
that existing policies are followed (Sinclair et al. 2010).
These studies showed that barriers related to safety values are often connected to 
the wider culture in corporations.
1.9 Corporate social responsibility
In our study, we regard organizational safety as a vital aspect of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), and as an aspect inherent in any business and production processes, which is impor-
tant for the corporate identity. This is most clearly the case in companies committed to “vision 
zero”: they feel their identity does not allow for (serious) accidents (Zwetsloot et al. 2013a). 
There are at least 37 different definitions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Car-
roll 2015). CSR is a form of company self-regulation integrated into a business model. 
CSR policy functions as a self-regulatory mechanism whereby a company monitors 
and ensures its active compliance with the spirit of law, ethical standards and nation-
al or international norms. The term “corporate social responsibility” became popular 
in the 1960s and has remained a term to cover legal and moral responsibility more 
narrowly construed. Davis (1973) insisted that social responsibility begins where the 
law ends. On the other hand, Epstein (1987) connected corporate social responsibili-
ty and business ethics together into corporate social policy process. Buytendijk (2010, 
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p. 124) wrote that a moral discussion on corporate social responsibility was debated 
in the 1980s, but now it is an acceptable standard set of behaviour.
According to Carroll (1979), the first conceptual model of corporate social perfor-
mance had three dimensions: 1) corporate social responsibilities, 2) the social issues 
must be identified, and 3) a response philosophy be chosen. Based on these dimen-
sions, he presented the following definition: “The social responsibility of business en-
compasses the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary expectations that society 
has of organizations at a given point in time” (p. 500), where legal, ethical and dis-
cretionary aspects were borrowed from Aupperle et al. (1985). In the empirical test 
of 241 CEOs, Aupperle et al. (1985) found a strong inverse relationship between the 
economic and ethical dimensions, which suggested a natural conflict of strategy. Lat-
er, Carroll (1983) replaces the discretionary expectations by a voluntary or philan-
thropic function. Carroll (1991) summarized that “the CSR firm should strive to make 
a profit, obey the law, be ethical, and be a good corporate citizen”.
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development defined corporate social re-
sponsibility as “the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable development 
(Holme and Watts 2000), working with employees, their families, the local communi-
ty and society at large to improve their quality of life”. On the other hand, Buytendijk 
(2010, p. 172) defined corporate social responsibility as “a balanced approach for or-
ganizations to integrate social and environmental concerns in business operations in 
a way that aims to benefit the organization and its internal and external stakeholders”. 
Corporate social responsibility is only one side of sustainability. The other researchers 
see that the social responsibility of corporations is to maximize profits (Friedman 1962), 
whereas the others see that corporations have a moral obligation to society. Based on 
his lexicographic view of social responsibility2, Johnson (1971) suggested that strongly 
profit-motivated firms may engage in socially responsible behaviour.
Corporate social performance has been found to be positively related to both past 
and future financial performance. Thus, good management and corporate social per-
formance are positively related (Waddock and Graves 1997). Corporate social respon-
sibility is highly correlated with the level of research and development (R&D) activi-
ties in the company but not with financial performance (McWilliams and Siegel 2000). 
Based on the 31 studies, Ullmann (1985) concluded that there is no discernible rela-
tionship between corporate social performance and financial performance. The rea-
sons are a lack of good data and valid, reliable measures.
2  In the lexicographic view of social responsibility, a company pays attention to social is-
sues only after meeting its profitability goals.
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In the long run, corporate social responsibility builds corporate brand image, strength-
ens stakeholder–company relationships, and enhances stakeholders’ advocacy be-
haviours for the company (Du et al. 2010).
Negative effects of corporate social responsibility were argued by Henderson (2001). 
He insisted that corporate social responsibility represents a clear break from tradi-
tional corporate value-setting. In the developing world, companies can benefit from 
corporate social responsibility, for example through the reduction in welfare fees they 
are required to pay. From a sociological point of view, corporate social responsibility 
is best analyzed based on the world-capitalism paradigm (Shamir 2011).
Carroll (2015) has presented three scenarios about the future of corporate social re-
sponsibility. In the Gloomy Scenario, the concept faded from the scene and disap-
peared from business’s agenda. The Hopeful Scenario is more optimistic, assuming 
that companies around the world increase their corporate social responsibility pro-
grammes. The Probable Scenario says that at least three factors – business acceptance, 
global growth and academic proliferation – keep the concept of corporate social re-
sponsibility alive and well. He assumed that the last one will be the trajectory for cor-
porate social responsibility over the coming five years or more.
Elkington (1997) introduced the framework of the triple bottom line (TBL or 3BL), by 
adding (apart from the economic bottom line) two more bottom lines; social equity 
and environmental factors, also known as 3P’s:  People, Planet and Profit. Fisk (2010) 
states that the concept of ‘People, planet and profit’ is much more than the conven-
tional idea of CSR, which he describes as compensating the damages already done. 
Henriques (2004) has noted that the TBL approach is necessary for sustainability, but 
on its own is not totally sufficient. Fonseca (2015) has suggested extending the TBL 
by adding ‘personal and family happiness’ as a fourth dimension. There are also other 
suggestions for additional dimensions, e.g. how organizations treat their employees3, 
progress4, spirituality (Inayatullah 2005) and compassion5. Dialogue with stakehold-
ers is often regarded as vital for CSR. It can hereby be useful to distinguish between 
 
 
3 Lawler E.E. (2014). The Quadruple Bottom Line: Its Time Has Come, Forbes,  forbes.com/
sites/edward-lawler/2014/05/07/the-quadruple-bottom-line-its-time-has-come/.
4 Cambridge Leadership Development. (2013). Quadruple Bottom Line for Sustaina-
ble Prosperity. Available from: cambridgeleadershipdevelopment.com/quadruple-bot-
tom-line-for-sustainable-prosperity/. [29 February 2016]
5 The Values-Based Business. (2014). Compassion as the fourth bottom line?. Available at 
http://valuesbased.biz/2014/08/10/compassion/valuesbased.biz/2014/08/10/compas-
sion/. [29 February 2016].
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external and internal stakeholders, the latter being the employees (who have a natu-
ral interest in safety and health at work) (Zwetsloot and Starren 2004).
The value that safety has for organizations can only partly be expressed in monetary 
terms, because issues like trust, better industrial relations, or avoiding painful conver-
sations with relatives of victims cannot be expressed adequately in monetary terms. 
The focus in safety management is usually on the “rationalities of prevention”, do-
ing things right, which implies an operational focus. When this is combined with val-
ue management and doing the right things (Zwetsloot 2003), a strategic approach 
to safety management is needed. Defining the value of safety in the context of busi-
ness strategy and CSR seems a logical next step for safety improvement.
1.10 Conclusions
With the literature review we aimed to provide information on the general back-
ground and context of safety values, to define safety value, and to explore value per-
spectives. The literature review offers essential background information for the de-
velopment of methods (surveys, interviews) presented in the next chapters.
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The following conclusions can be drawn from the literature review:
1. There is not yet a clear and broadly accepted definition of the va-
lue of safety or safety values.
2. Safety is a value in itself, associated with a basic human right.
3. The value of safety is often implicitly associated with the importan-
ce associated with safety in the organization.
4. “Safety as a value” goes beyond “safety as a priority”. Organizatio-
nal values have a more strategic impact than priorities. They can al-
so be expected to have implications for a longer period, as priori-
ties may easily change, while shared values are much more stable 
over time.
5. There are several safety-related values that are important for de-
veloping or supporting safety practices and/or safety culture. The 
most well-known are justice (Dekker 2007; Reason 1997), trust and 
informedness (Reason 1997). Trust between managers and emplo-
yees, as well as a just culture seem to be necessary preconditions 
for the spread of safety values.
6. Safety values are closely related to organizational culture. But safe-
ty culture is a broader concept (also with many definitions), which 
includes, in addition to values, norms, beliefs, practices and prin-
ciples that can be related to safety.
7. Top managers and supervisors can strengthen safety values by 
consistent actions.
8. It is important to distinguish between values that are really shared 
and lived-up to, and espoused values, which are mainly communi-
cated verbally and in writing. When there is a difference between 
the two, employees will not believe the espoused values. Emplo-
yees look at safety values in more practical ways than managers 
and often do not share the same safety values as managers.
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2 INTERVIEWS WITH STAKEHOLDERS
2.1 Objectives
The second phase of the VALOSA project involved interviews with senior managers, to 
obtain practice-based information on safety values and their impact on an organization’s 
functions. The aim of the interviews was to find out:
• How safety values are defined
• What are the background and motives for safety
• How values are shared
• How values affect daily routines
The information gathered in interviews was used to develop the topics and questions 
for the Delphi study, which is discussed in chapter 3.
2.2 Data
Seventeen CEOs or top managers in 15 organizations from five European countries 
(Finland, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, and Turkey) were interviewed. The or-
ganizations represent different sectors: Industrial services, Construction, Production, 
Trade, Transportation & Logistics, Waste, Power plants and Food. The number of em-
ployees working in the organizations varied from 100 to 70000. The interviewed CE-
Os and managers had up to 16000 subordinates. Some of the organizations were 
global companies.
2.3 Method
The semi-structured interview method was developed based on the literature re-
view. The interviews were carried out as face-to-face interviews or using telephone 
or Skype/video meeting connections. A summary of the interview was sent to the in-
terviewee for revision and comments when desired by the CEO/manager. Each inter-
view lasted approximately one hour, and covered:
• Background information of the interviewee and organization
• Corporate values (core values, meaning of safety)
• Background and motives for safety
• How an organization shares the value of safety
• Values in everyday work (motivation, dilemmas on value conflicts, value differ- 
ences in different personnel groups)
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Corporate values
In every company concerned by the interviews, corporate values were defined and some 
of the CEOs/managers mentioned that values were defined together with the personnel. 
In most cases, there were five core values, for example on respect, quality or safety. How-
ever, safety was not always mentioned as a core value, since safety was seen as so embed-
ded in the core business (demonstrated in the mission statement) that it was not regard-
ed necessary to also include safety explicitly in the company’s core values. Safety culture 
was seen to “dominate” organizational culture: safety is an “umbrella of core values”. 
Safety was seen as:
• a priority, more important than productivity or any other thing
• a quality of work/product (sign of an expertise, efficiency of production)
• an investment for employees and the future of the company
• a goal, but also as an objective: a part of one’s everyday work
The core values also corresponded with the interviewed CEO’s/manager’s own per-
sonal values. According to the CEOs/managers, it is important that the same values 
are shared also in personal life; thus one can commit themselves to the company’s 
values, and can defend the values and “walk the talk”.
2.4.2 Background and motives for safety
The background and motives for safety were based on the view that safety is a neces-
sity, an integrated/built-in part of action/business or the core of the business. Safety 
risks and problems were seen as signs of poor management: an answer to how well 
the business is managed. The company was also seen to be responsible for taking 
care for human well-being (both their health and safety), the families of employees 
and society. Good safety and good working conditions were also seen as a way to 
attract employees, to commit them to the company: “Safety costs money, but in re-
turn you get: involvement and passion for the job.”
The people interviewed perceived good safety to be a sign of:
• good business
• good management
• a responsible and respected employer
• engaged employees
The importance of safety was also partly based on the demands of the authorities 
or customer and the surrounding society: Legislation and instructions of authori-
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ties, information requirements (e.g. audit, accidents reports) of customers, reputa-
tion among customers and in the society. These reasons were, however, mentioned 
as secondary motivations for safety. As one CEO said: “Neither the legislation nor the 
customers set pressure; the company is ahead of them”. It is the companies them-
selves that have the responsibility for safety. Taking care of the company reputation 
was seen as one of the factors which motivates companies to do their best in safe-
ty. The government’s role is important to control, for example for the development 
of new equipment, or chemicals, however, it should be done with trust and not on-
ly with more paperwork. All this also requires that the company can afford and have 
resources to take care of safety. It was mentioned that the societal responsibility and 
the costs requirements do not always go together.
2.4.3 Sharing values
The most common way to share the value of safety was communication. Regular 
(managerial) meetings (safety as the first thing in the discussion list), safety walks, 
information sessions, leaflets, posters, videos, campaigns and yearly safety events 
were mentioned as ways to communicate with employees on safety related issues. 
Employees were also invited and encouraged to ‘blow the whistle’ or leave a com-
plaint in a safety box about their safety concerns. The spreading of the safety story 
throughout the organization was mentioned as a much better way of dealing with 
safety than with the standard toolboxes and audits.
The importance of role behaviour of the management was also emphasized in the 
CEO/manager interviews. Management visits to the workplace were seen as a good 
way of showing the value of safety for employees. Opportunities to discuss with man-
agement were raised as a key solution especially in cases where the company want-
ed to modify their safety culture. In one of the studied companies, the CEO had small 
group meetings with all of the employees to spread the safety message.
Core values can be used in communication and strategy anchoring. In addition to this, 
values have been useful in cases of problems with an individual’s behaviour (behav-
iour is in conflict with the organization’s values). Values were seen as an excellent in-
strument to give constructive feedback in such situations and to open up discussion.
The second most common way to share the value of safety was training. In particular, 
orientation of new employees was mentioned as a way to share the value of safety. 
However, sometimes all employees get regular training on safety related issues. Also 
a culture of continuous professional education was mentioned as a goal of the com-
pany. In some cases, compatibility with a company’s values is explicitly used as selec-
tion criteria during recruitment.
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The third way to share the value of safety was the company’s development climate: the 
openness to new ideas, continual development of practices and products, following the 
development in other companies or field of business. These were often mentioned as a 
“good practice”, a sign that the company values safety and does its best to improve it.
Interviewees also mentioned transparent reporting for accidents and near misses; an 
open process to investigate accidents and near misses; and yearly self-evaluation or 
measurement of safety changes work habits/proactive behavioural measures. In some 
companies, the aim was also to develop measurement to be more proactive, not only 
measures of things that had already happened or almost happened. Instead, the aim was, 
for example, in future to analyze the data to find ‘tip of the iceberg’ issues or problems.
Less commonly mentioned ways were:
• use of safety bonuses: sometimes it was for management only, but in some 
cases for each employee
• an annual performance appraisal of employees (a tool to discuss the gap be-
tween managers’ and employees’ own perceptions)
• involvement of supervisors and employees in decision-making
• fair and honest project calculations
• co-operation with other companies, networks, and universities or schools
• a company’s own initiative to organize once or twice a year a high-level meet-
ing on safety together with other parties
2.4.4 Values in everyday work
The CEOs/managers also recognized some challenges in successfully sharing the safety val-
ues of the company in everyday work. The challenges inside the company are related to:
• employees’ attitudes towards safety, complying with regulations and standards
• the dilemma of the costs of best safety available and the financial situation/decision
To tackle employees’ attitudes towards safety, different approaches are used. For example:
• motivating the less motivated people was seen as the duty of managers/ 
supervisors
• use of fast and flexible work habits in the tasks in which safety is required
• paying attention to planning and scheduling, not accepting haste as an ex-
cuse
• “competing” on safety
The attitudes towards using money (pay) as a way to motivate employees were con-
tradictory. Whereas in some companies good wages were used as a source of motiva-
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tion, in others they were not – we don’t offer a salary: we offer a future, a perspective.
It was recognized that the high ambitions on professionalism and craftsman-
ship sometimes lead to frustration, e.g. in case of disappointments when things 
don’t work out because of planning/money issues. This can be a trigger for un-
safe acts. Also the need to innovate and find new ways of working can be excit-
ing and unsafe at the same time. Finding the right balance in these issues was 
seen as a challenge.
The CEOs/managers saw the safety attitudes as an individual-based issue and, for ex-
ample, gender was not seen to have a role in it. The differences were seen between 
individuals in every group. However, views related to the role of age differed. Sen-
tence should become: Some CEOs/managers said that younger employees have bet-
ter safety values and culture compared to older employees; while some saw older 
employees as opinion leaders. Some said that young employees might face more ac-
cidents, but it’s about lack of skills and lack of understanding of risks, and some said 
that young employees used more often personal protective equipment than older 
ones. Some saw differences in values and safety culture between different locations. 
However, it seems that the main problem is that risk is not recognized, which is why 
employees continue to work in unsafe ways or situations.
The challenges related to the surrounding society are:
• (Sub)contractors’ safety values or quality standards: e.g. in the common 
workplace, where the habits of different companies do not match
• Country culture: e.g. attitudes towards safety, education
• Global situation: e.g. conflict areas (general safety level in a country)
• EU directives on governmental tendering: e.g. suppliers are competing on 
price only, and that safety qualities of products and services are not consid-
ered
To tackle the in consistency of company’s own safety values and requirements and 
the values and requirements of (sub)contractors, some companies offer safety train-
ing to their contractors or require, for example, a general occupational safety card.
2.5 Conclusions
The interviews showed that in every company the corporate values were defined. 
However, safety was not always mentioned as a core value, since safety was seen so 
much embedded in the core business (demonstrated in the mission statement) that 
it was not regarded necessary to also include safety explicitly in the company’s core 
values. The core values also correspond with the interviewed CEO’s/manager’s own 
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personal values, thus they could commit themselves for company’s values, can de-
fend the values and “walk the talk”.
Safety was seen as:
• a priority, more important than productivity or any other thing
• a quality of work/product (sign of an expertise, efficiency of production)
• an investment for employees and the future of the company
• a goal, but also as an objective: a part of one’s everyday work
The background and motives for safety were based on the view that safety is a ne-
cessity, an integrated/built-in part of action/business or the core of the business. The 
importance of safety was also partly based on the demands of the authorities or cus-
tomer and the surrounding society: Legislation and instructions of authorities, infor-
mation requirements (e.g. audit, accident reports) of customers, reputation among 
customers and in the society. These reasons were, however, mentioned as second-
ary motivations for safety. 
Good safety is a sign of:
• good business
• good management
• responsible and respected employer
• engaged employees
The most common ways to share the value of safety were
• communication (regular meetings, different kind of information material, 
joint discussions)
• training
• continuous development of practices and products
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3 DELPHI STUDY
As the literature review showed (cf. chapter 1), there is no generally accepted defini-
tion for “safety as an organizational value” or “having safety as a value”. Along with 
exploration of the definition and possibilities of the concept of a safety culture, the 
question of the relationship between organizational values, safety as a value, and 
safety has arisen. To state that safety is a value or core value is very abstract and the 
meaning in practice is unclear. Through the Delphi study, we aimed to fill that gap.
3.1 Objectives
The aim of the Delphi study was to develop consensus on:
1. a) what it means when safety is an organizational value and b) the value safe-
ty has for organizations (i.e. added value)
2. the most relevant factors that influence the value of safety
3. factors that are expressions of having safety as a value and can be used to re-
cognize or perhaps measure safety as a value
4. the ethical justification of “having safety as an organizational value”
3.2 Data collected
The sample was gathered amongst European safety experts from various back-
grounds and positions who were deemed to have a valuable (expert) opinion on the 
topic of safety. Various CEOs and production managers, safety engineers, workers or 
workers’ representatives, representatives of local or national authorities (including 
inspections), safety researchers or experts, and (social and privacy) insurers spread 
over Europe were invited. The connections were received via the researchers’ profes-
sional networks, via the participant lists of safety conferences, and through a list ob-
tained from www.CEOemail.com.
All respondents were invited via a personal email.  A link to the online questionnaire 
was included in this email. All questionnaires were filled out via TNO’s online survey 
system. The questionnaire was available in Dutch, English, and Finnish and respond-
ents were able to choose their preferred language. The first round took place in the 
period between May and July 2015. On May 27th, the first invitations were sent and 
on June 8th a reminder was sent. The round was closed on July 3rd. Respondents 
were given a short introduction to the purpose of the Delphi panel before being pre-
sented with the various prepared statements.
Round 2 took place in November 2015. Participants were invited on the 3rd of No-
vember and reminders were sent on the 19th. This round was closed on the 23rd of 
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November. During the second round, the panel was given a summary of the results 
from the first round and the panel members received an overview of the responses 
for the items where no consensus had been found in the first round. Concerning the 
latter, the experts were first asked to reflect on the overview and their response, and 
secondly, whether they would like to revise their original score.
For the first round of the Delphi panel, 750 individuals were approached by email to 
participate in the first round of the Delphi panel.  This included 257 professionals from 
the personal networks of the involved researchers and 493 additional CEOs, whose 
contact information had been obtained through www.CEOemail.com.
In total, 111 individuals started the questionnaire, indicating a total response rate of 
14.8%. However, this response rate is biased since only 15 individuals from the list of 
493 CEOs responded (response rate 3.0%). The response rate from the personal net-
work was 37.3% with 96 participants.
Only individuals who had less than 50% missing values were included in data analy-
sis, leaving 82 (73.9%) individuals (6 from the CEO list). Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show the 
distribution of respondents’ self-reported backgrounds and functions. Individuals 
from 17 European countries participated. Furthermore, it was known that 65.9% were 
male and that 50.0% were older than 50, 39.0% between 35 and 50, and 7.3% young-
er than 35 (3.7% missing).
Figure 3.1 Backgrounds of the respondents participating in the Delphi panel.
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CEO or production manager
Operational workers or worker representative
Safety engineer
Safety researcher
Representative of local or national authority
Social or private insurer
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Figure 3.2 Functions of the respondents participating in the Delphi panel.
The 82 participants who completed round one were invited to participate in round 
two. In total, 36 respondents started with the questionnaire from round 2 (43.9%). 
Only 25 participants (2 still from the www.CEOemail.com list) had fewer than 50% 
missing values and were included in the analysis. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 also provides the 
self-reported backgrounds and functions for the participants of round two. Concern-
ing the participants from round 2, 65.2% were male and 40% were older than 50, 40% 
between 35 and 50, and 12% younger than 35 (8% missing).
3.3 Method
A Delphi study is frequently used to develop consensus on what a specific new 
concept or development means, especially when opinions are expected to be di-
verse, and to define what factors are relevant for addressing a new complex issue, 
or what factors should be regarded as relevant for future developments. Therefore, 
in this part of our study we decided to use a Delphi panel to answer our research 
questions. Delphi studies have been widely used to collect the opinions of experts 
on various subjects (Buccini et al. 2009; Robinson et al. 2015; van Scheppingen et 
al. 2015). A Delphi study generally consists of several phases, or rounds (Martino 
1972; Hsu and Sandford 2007; Yousuf 2007), and provides a systematic method-
ology to collect the opinions of a small but knowledgeable sample of experts to 
arrive at a meaningful consensus. Classical Delphi studies consist of four rounds, 
however two rounds can also be sufficient (Martino 1972; van Scheppingen et al. 
2015). In this study, a questionnaire was developed addressing several aspects re-
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38
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
lated to safety as an organizational value. This questionnaire was presented to the 
Delphi panel in two rounds.
The input for the structure and the items of the Delphi study were based on the liter-
ature study and the interviews with experts and relevant stakeholders that were also 
part of the VALOSA project. First, the literature study was conducted to explore the 
relatively unknown field of safety values. Based on these findings, we developed a 
structured interview format for one of the most important stakeholder groups, which 
is seldom involved in safety research: senior managers. This has led to the following 
five main topics for the structure for the Delphi questionnaire:
1. What having safety as a core value exactly means for an organization
 a. When safety is an organizational value, 
 b. The value safety has for organizations
2. Factors that influence how safety is valued within organizations
3. The manifestation in an organization of having safety as a value
4. The ethical justification of having safety as an organizational value.
All items in these categories of the Delphi study have been derived from the liter-
ature and the earlier interviews. The resulting questionnaire includes a list of 107 
statements or factors considered relevant to understanding safety as an organiza-
tional value. The items are structured according to the four main topics, which dif-
fer in content but also in response format. Table 3.1 presents an overview of the re-
sponse formats and the number of items in the Delphi questionnaire for each topic. 
The individual statements from the Delphi study are shown in chapter 3.5. In the first 
round, the respondents were given the option to suggest additional statements or 
factors thought to be lacking. These suggestions were taken into consideration for 
the second round.
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Table 3.1 Summary of characteristics of the Delphi questionnaire
Topic Items Answering scale
1 What does having safety as a core 
value exactly mean for an  
organization?
38
a) When safety is an organizational va-
lue, this [means that safety is]…
21 5-point Likert scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5  
(strongly agree).b) If safety has value for organizations, 
this implies that…
17
2 Factors that influence how safety is 
valued within organizations
39
a) Developments in national and inter-
national society
6 11-point scale ranging from 
-5 (very negative influence) 
to 5 (very positive influence) 
with 0 in between as indi-
cator of the belief that the 
factor has no influence
b) External factors 9
c) Organizational factors 5
d) Business values 14
e) Personal initiatives 5 6-point Likert scale of 0 to 
5, assuming the initiatives 
are likely to have a positi-
ve affect (or else they would 
not be undertaken)
3 How is having safety as a value 
expected to manifest in an  
organization?
24
a) Visibility in culture and behaviour 9 6-point Likert scale ranging 
from 0 (not characteristic at 
all) to 5 (very characteristic).
b) Visibility in management actions 5
c) Visibility in organization 10
4 What is the ethical justification for 
having safety as an organizational 
value?
6 5-point Likert scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5  
(strongly agree)
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3.4 Analysis
The main aim of the Delphi panel is to achieve consensus. Since the survey items used 
for this Delphi study make use of several different answer scales, two different sets 
of criteria were required for determining consensus. Table 3.2 summarizes the crite-
ria for consensus for each topic.
For topics 1 and 4, the direction of consensus was determined by the median: a me-
dian lower than 3 meant consenting disagreement, a median higher than 3 meant 
consenting agreement, and a median of 3 indicated a consensus that respondents 
neither agreed nor disagreed. 
For both topics 2 and 3, consensus was determined by looking at the distribution of 
the responses over the groups. Responses falling in a certain category were regard-
ed as consensus if they exceeded 60% and none of the other categories had more 
than 25% of responses.
When considering the results, it is important to note that the fact that there was no 
consensus among the Delphi panelists does not mean that there was consensus that 
safety does not contribute to these values.
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Table 3.2 Summary of criteria for consensus in the Delphi study.
Topic Answering scale Criteria for consensus
1 What does ha-
ving safety as a 
core value exact-
ly mean for an or-
ganization?
5-point Likert sca-
le from 1 (strongly di-
sagree) to 5 (strong-
ly agree).
Interquartile range (IQR) 1 or lower
≥50% of all responses (those 
between the 25th and 75th quartiles) 
fall within 1 point of the scale.
2 Factors that  
influence how  
safety is valued 
within organiza-
tions
11-point scale ran-
ging from -5 (very ne-
gative influence) to 5 
(very positive influen-
ce) with 0 for ‘no in-
fluence’
Category 1: Respondents who consi-
der the factor to have a negative in-
fluence (-5 to -1)
Category 2. Respondents who con-
sider the factor to have no influen-
ce (0)
Category 3. Respondents who consi-
der the factor to have a positive in-
fluence (1 to 5)
6-point Likert scale of 
0 to 5
Category 2. Respondents who con-
sider the factor to have no influen-
ce (0)
Category 3. Respondents who consi-
der the factor to have a positive in-
fluence (1 to 5)
3 How is having sa-
fety as a value 
expected to ma-
nifest in an orga-
nization?
6-point Likert sca-
le ranging from 0 (not 
characteristic at all) to 
5 (very characteristic).
1. Respondents who consider the 
statement not to be characteristic (1)
2. Respondents who consider the 
statement a little characteristic (2 to 
3)
3. Respondents who consider the 
statement very characteristic (4 to 5)
4 What is the ethi-
cal justification 
for having safety 
as an organizatio-
nal value?
5-point Likert sca-
le from 1 (strongly di-
sagree) to 5 (strong-
ly agree
IQR 1 or lower
≥50% of all responses (those 
between the 25th and 75th quartiles) 
fall within 1 point of the scale.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Safety as an organizational value
In the Delphi study, 21 statements represented possible meanings of safety as an or-
ganizational value. There was consensus among the respondents concerning twenty 
of these statements in the first round (see Table 3.3).
There was no consensus for one statement only: When safety is an organizational val-
ue this means taking responsibility for the safety of the local community. In the sec-
ond round, this non-consensus was confirmed. In the second round, clarifications for 
the disagreement were given:
• It seems more appropriate that safety as an organizational value concerns the 
organization, and not the local community
• This is too idealistic, especially for SMEs, which account for more than 95% 
of companies
• The current situation in our country shows that you have to start with the in-
ternal working environment, include safety aspects in work with subcontrac-
tors, sharing experience with other companies, etc. and only then should you 
take responsibility for the local community.
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Table 3.3 The consensus statements on “when safety is an organizational value”
When safety is an organizational value, this means that safety is…
 … a core aspect of all business processes
 … part of responsible operations
 …. a good investment in a sustainable future
 … a moral obligation
 … a core competence of professional skills
 … a binding factor between companies and society
 … more than calculating costs of accidents
When safety is an organizational value, this …
 … means taking responsibility for the safety of all employees
 … means that safety belongs to everyday business activities and decisions
 … means important safety investments are made despite the costs
 … means that safety is linked to the mission of the organization
 … means that safety is mentioned in the organization’s core values
 … means that safety belongs to ‘the genes’ of the organization
 … means there are long-term ambitions to improve safety
 … means that safety is an important aspect of personnel development  
 … implies a long-term commitment to safety
 … ensures that future managers will be committed to safety 
 ... ensures high safety standards (even in difficult periods)
 … generates a supporting work culture (climate) for safety
 … makes employees feel safe
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3.5.2 The value safety has for organizations
The value that safety has for an organization was addressed by 17 statements. In 
these statements, safety is not regarded as a value in itself, but primarily as a factor 
that (also) contributes to other values. The first round resulted in consensus for 12 of 
these statements, and in the second round positive consensus was achieved for two 
additional items (see Table 3.4). No consensus was generated for three of the state-
ments. These are presented in Table 3.5, along with some clarifications given by the 
respondents of the second round.
Table 3.4 The consensus statements on “the value safety has for organizations”. Items marked with an 
asterisk* only saw consensus in the second round.
If safety has a value for organizations, this implies that safety …
 … contributes to good business
 … contributes to trust of employees in the management
 … contributes to better relations between employer and employees
 … contributes to better relations with the local community
 … contributes to the attractiveness as an employer
 … contributes to the corporate image of a reliable company
 … contributes to the well-being of the personnel
 … is regarded essential for the continuity of production
 … is appreciated by customers
 … means that the organization is ‘in control’ of its production
 … helps avoiding economic loss
 … means that safety is an aspect of environmental protection
 … contributes to the marketing of products or services*
 … helps to avoid painful conversations with relatives of victims*
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Table 3.5 No consensus statements on “the value safety has for organizations”.
No consensus statements Explanations given
If safety has a value for orga-
nizations, this implies that sa-
fety contributes to better use 
of industrial assets
Pro: I see safety and reliability as tightly coupled in 
the production process
Contra: In some cases, safety is not necessarily help-
ful to use resources.
If safety has a value for orga-
nizations, this implies that sa-
fety is key to delivering in-
dustrial services
Pro: if safety is valued highly, the service delivery 
should also put special emphasis on safety issues.
Contra: 
It could perhaps improve industrial services, but it is 
not key.
This is context dependent
If safety has a value for orga-
nizations, this implies that sa-
fety will lead to lower insuran-
ce costs
Pro: the impact depends on the national system of 
insurance. But all in all, insurance costs should dec-
rease
Contra: 
Insurance costs mainly depend on other factors
In my country, social insurance against workplace ac-
cidents and diseases is compulsory, with premium 
rates identical for all companies (e.g. banks and 
construction companies pay identical premium rates)
3.5.3 Influencing factors
With influencing factors, we aimed to obtain the respondents’ expert opinions on 
factors that influence the value of safety, and whether this influence was positive or 
negative. It can be seen that most factors were considered a positive influence and 
for six statements no consensus was found.
In the first round, consensus was reached on 33 out of 39 statements. Only econom-
ic crises were seen to negatively affect the way in which safety is valued in organiza-
tions. All other statements, like media attention to accidents, were commonly viewed 
to have a positive effect on value of safety in organizations. In addition to the 33 items 
of the first round, consensus was achieved on one additional item after revisions in 
the second round, which was the effect of the business value ‘competitiveness’. The 
individual items and influencing factors are given in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.6 Consensus for the statements concerning influencing factors. Items marked with an asterisk* 
saw consensus reached only in the second round.
Consensus on factors that influence how safety is  
valued in organizations
Direction of 
consensus
Developments in national 
and international society
Growing societal attention for safety +
Growing societal unacceptance of risks +
Growing attention for disasters in the press +
Growing importance of Corporate Social  
Responsibility
+
Growing importance of business ethics +
External factors Governmental inspections +
Media attention to accidents +
Economic crisis -
Communication with external stakeholders +
Legal Requirements +
Best practices of other companies +
Requirements from important customers +
Requirements from (social or private) insurers +
Organizational factors The experience of a serious accident +
Activities of workers or their unions to improve safety +
The adoption of “vision zero” (striving for zero  
accidents and/or harm)
+
Business values Transparency (openness) +
Trust +
Justice +
Productivity +
Innovation +
Responsibility +
Sustainability +
Operational excellence +
Integrity +
Commitment +
Health +
Well being +
Competitiveness* +
Personal initiatives Initiatives from the CEO +
Individual (higher) managers performing  
exemplary behavior
+
Initiatives from safety engineers/professionals +
Initiatives from employees +
Initiatives from family members +
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Concerning the factors that influence how safety is valued in organizations, for the 
following five statements no consensus was achieved in either of the rounds:
• An ageing working population
• Scarcity of qualified personnel
• Cost saving programmes
• Changes in corporate management
• Diversity
There is no consensus on the influence of diversity and an ageing working popula-
tion on safety as a value. According to the Delphi panelists, both tend to have a pos-
itive influence on safety as a value. There is no consensus on the influence of ‘Chang-
es in corporate management’; a more in-depth look into the data shows that 59% of 
the respondents agreed that there is a neutral (0) influence of management chang-
es on safety as a value. Also there is non-consensus on the influence of Cost Saving 
programmes and Scarcity of Qualified Personnel. Both were regarded as more neg-
ative than positive in their influence by the respondents.
3.5.4 Visibility in practice
Twenty-four items addressed describing visibility, meaning mechanisms for having 
safety as an organizational value become recognized in practice was addressed: in 
culture and behaviour, in management actions, and in the organization. Consensus 
was achieved for 21 of them; one of them after the second round (see Table 3.7). 
There were three items with no consensus in either of the rounds (see Table 3.8).
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Table 3.7 Consensus items concerning visibility of safety values. The item marked with an asterisk* only 
saw consensus in the second round.
In culture and 
behaviour
The working habits reflect safety values
Safety is regularly discussed informally
There is shared understanding of safety issues
It is preferred to choose safe ways of working in every situation
Work is always done safely (or else production is stopped)
Even if safe work is considered more difficult or time consuming, 
it is the preferred way of working
Safety is always being discussed in work meetings*Pro: I see sa-
fety and reliability as tightly coupled in the production process
Contra: In some cases, safety is not necessarily helpful to use 
resources.
In management 
actions
High appreciation for safety can be recognized in the top mana-
gement’s agenda
Managers promote safety actively
Safety aspects are explicitly taken into account in all decisions
Managers and supervisors talk about safety issues with emplo-
yees
Managers and supervisors show exemplary behaviour by acting 
safely
In the organization The value of safety is visible in an excellent safety culture
Safety is part of the organization’s training
Safety is considered in guidelines and procedures
Safety gets priority over productivity
The focus is more on preventive maintenance than on correcti-
ve maintenance
Safety extends to contractors management
Safety is considered when evaluating new business opportuni-
ties
Safety is considered when introducing new technologies
Safety is an important topic in corporate communication
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Table 3.8 Items with no consensus concerning the visibility of safety values.
In culture and 
behaviour
Safe behaviour is just as important in private life as in the job
Safety issues are also communicated with partners/family members
In the  
organization
In organization Safety is part of the rewarding systems
3.5.5 Ethical justifications
We stated six items related to the ethical justification of safety as an organization-
al value. In the first round, six items were included; for three of them consensus 
was achieved, for the other three this was not the case. In the second round, the 
three items for which no consensus was achieved were included. In round 2, these 
non-consensus factors were confirmed.
The items concerning ethical justifications on which consensus was reached in the 
first round are presented in Table 3.9. The results show that the first two statements 
have been confirmed strongly as consensus items (> 80% strongly agree). The third 
statement is almost fully agreed on, although less strongly. There were three items 
concerning ethical justifications that did not lead to consensus in both rounds (see 
Table 3.10).
Table 3.9 Items with consensus concerning ethical justifications of safety values.
Occupational safety is a fundamental human right
Every employee has the right to return home safely after work
Safety is important in order to reduce human suffering
Table 3.10 Items with no consensus concerning ethical justifications of safety values.
All serious accidents can be prevented
All minor accidents can be prevented
The only justified goal for safety policy is zero accidents
Many respondents responded that all serious accidents can be prevented, but not 
enough to meet our criteria for consensus. There was less agreement on the state-
ment that all minor incidents can be prevented.  Also many respondents agree that 
zero accidents is the only justified goal for safety, but again not enough for consen-
sus.  This could be caused by the strong formulation (i.e. “the only justified goal”).
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3.6 Discussion
The aim of this Delphi study was to find consensus on safety values and their impact 
on an organization’s functions, and at the same time to verify whether the outcomes 
of the interviews are shared by a broad range of stakeholders from industry, govern-
ment, inspection and insurance companies.
Through the Delphi study, we were able to develop a consensus on what it means 
when safety is an organizational value, together with consensus on what the poten-
tial benefits of safety as a value are, what factors it is influenced by and how to rec-
ognize it in practice.
3.6.1 Safety as an organizational value
The result of our Delphi study is consensus among the experts/stakeholders partic-
ipating in the study about what it means when safety is an organizational value (or 
perhaps core value). This gives also clarity in what it means when the IAEA (for nu-
clear power plants) or the European Commission (for offshore installations in the oil 
and gas industry) require that these industries have safety as a core value: what are 
the values that need to be dealt with, and how can they be influenced?
Ke
y I
ssu
e
Based on the Delphi study, we conclude that when safety is an organiza-
tional value, this means that safety is regarded as a positive value in it-
self, that it is integrated into the business strategy as well as in all busi-
ness operations; it generates a work culture that is positive for safety, and 
it implies a long-term commitment. It also implies some guarantees that 
safety will be important in the future, e.g. it ensures that future managers 
will be committed to safety. 
However, it seems the respondents consider an organizational value pri-
marily as an internal issue, since there was no consensus on having safety 
as an organizational value meaning taking responsibility for safety of the 
local community.
3.6.2 Value that safety has for organizations
When exploring the value safety has for organizations, it can be concluded that safety 
has a value for organizations, apart from the meaning of safety as an organizational 
value in itself. This added value is certainly economic in nature (good business, corpo-
rate image, the continuity of the organization, appreciated by customers, helping to 
avoid economic loss). The consensus items in this section show that safety has many 
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organizational qualities. It contributes to good business and better control over pro-
duction processes, to better relationships between the employer and the employees, 
to the attractiveness of the organization on the labour market, it is often appreciated 
by customers and helps in the marketing of products, it contributes to environmen-
tal protection, etc. It seems to imply that good safety management is actually an im-
portant aspect of good management.
The non-consensus items seem to represent values that safety can have (better use of 
industrial assets, being key to delivering industrial services, lower insurance costs), but 
that are clearly context dependent. The specific context of certain branches or company 
cultures can make a difference. While for contractors doing maintenance work in high 
hazard industries like the chemical industry, safety is a key to delivering industrial ser-
vices, this may be a low priority issue when they do maintenance work for a company/
industries with less inherent risks (a contract in financial services for an IT company).
3.6.3 Influencing factors
In the Delphi study, three levels of context factors influencing safety as a value were identified: 
1) societal (developments in national and international society, external factors), 2) organi-
zational (organizational factors, business values), and 3) individual level (personal initiatives).
The factors at a societal level, as addressed in this part of the Delphi study, include 
external factors that are dominantly stemming from society at large and from nation-
al and international developments in the relationships between businesses and soci-
ety. This implies that these factors form the context wherein individual organizations 
operate. According to our panel, these factors have an influence on safety as a value 
which is positive, except one: the economic crisis. Apparently safety has the tenden-
cy to descend on the priority list when ‘day-to-day survival’ comes up. This finding is 
compatible with the well-known “drift to danger” concept, introduced by (Rasmus-
sen 1997), which implies that continuous cost reduction efforts may easily under-
mine safety margins. Less clear, the external influence of Scarcity of qualified person-
nel shows a slightly negative influence, although consensus has not been reached. 
This could be an indication that sudden economic growth on the other hand can al-
so be a critical issue for safety as a value, and that a fit of competent labour resourc-
es is very important for safety. Also, no consensus has been found on the role of an 
ageing working population on safety as a value. In both cases, there were more Del-
phi panelists who saw a positive influence than a negative one.
Non-consensus may be due to different compensation systems in the participants’ 
countries. Thus, we cannot exclude the idea that safety contributes to these values. 
Factors on a societal level (developments in national and international society, exter-
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nal factors) form the context for organizations on how to deal with safety. Most of 
these factors are seen as positive influencing factors for safety, except for the eco-
nomic crisis, which is seen as a negative influencer.
The factors at the organizational level (organizational factors, e.g. the occurrence 
of accidents, and business values like trust) are factors that in most cases can be 
changed within the organizations themselves. Most of the factors on the organiza-
tional level, like the occurrence of accidents, are agreed to be positive for safety as a 
value. These factors can mostly be controlled by the organization itself. No consen-
sus has been achieved on the influence of Cost saving programmes, but most pan-
elists saw a negative tendency here. Hence, costs saving programmes probably have 
a high priority during crises, and so are a threat for safety as a value. Also no con-
sensus has been found on the influence of “Changes in corporate management”. The 
Delphi study shows that more than half of the respondents say there is a neutral (0) 
influence of management changes on safety as a value. However, this could be be-
cause the direction of this influence is very dependent on the manager.  The busi-
ness values that were found to have positive influence on safety as a value, more or 
less, correspond with the more concrete ‘added-values of safety as a value’ that were 
identified and discussed in the former section. 
The last sub category concerns the individual level, e.g. the ‘personal initiatives’ that 
influence safety as a value. Our Delphi study underlines that all internal stakehold-
ers (CEO, higher managers, Safety engineers/professionals, and employees) as well 
as family members can have a positive influence. For CEOs and higher managers this 
more or less reflects the literature on the importance of safety leadership, those of 
employees the literature on participation.
3.6.4 Visibility
Concerning the visibility of safety as a value, the results show that safety as a value is 
expressed by informal talking and communication about safety. The results also show 
that the state of unsafety has its boundaries, and action is taken when these bound-
aries are passed, even if this requires additional time and effort. Safety as a value is 
also reflected by management communication, setting of priorities and role behav-
iour in safety. It becomes also visible by integrating it in operational processes, like 
maintenance, training, procedures, interaction with contractors, investment choices 
and priority setting. The results also show that safety at home and safety in the work-
place are not related to safety as a value in a straightforward way.
The importance that is given to safety in the workplace in relation to safety at home 
differs and may be very personal. There was no consensus that safety as a value is vis-
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ible in the reward systems. This can have various reasons, e.g. safety results may not 
be formally included in a reward system, but more informally communicated as pos-
itive feedback. This is dependent on the formal policies of the company or branch.
3.6.5 Ethical justification of safety as a value
This Delphi study shows very strongly that a safe workplace is a fundamental right and 
that it is broadly accepted that every employee has the right to return home safely after 
work. Also safety was considered as an important factor in reducing human suffering.
There is no consensus on the three statements referring to ‘zero accidents’. This is 
clearly an area where safety experts do disagree: more people agree that all serious 
accidents can be prevented than that all minor incidents can be prevented. Also many 
respondents agree that zero accidents is the only justified goal for safety. However, 
there were not enough agreements for consensus. This could be caused by the strong 
formulation (i.e. the only justified goal).
The disagreement could also be partly explained by the distinction that can be made be-
tween ‘vision zero’, expressing the ambition to prevent all (serious) accidents, if not now 
than in the longer term, and safety as an accountable target (Zwetsloot et al. 2013a). Oth-
ers may associate ‘zero accidents’ with an ‘accountable zero accident goal’, (Zwetsloot et al. 
2013a) which can easily lead to false safety. Again, it is important to keep in mind that no 
consensus means that expert opinions vary, which seems to suggest that further research 
is needed, and perhaps further conceptual clarifications are required.
3.7 Conclusion
In this study, we wanted to develop a consensus on how safety as a value is defined 
by a variety of key stakeholders; CEOs/managers, employee representatives, safety ex-
perts, representatives of authorities and of private or social insurance, and researchers. 
We also wanted to identify practical dilemmas and bottlenecks when aiming to have 
safety as a value, as well as to find suggestions as to how organizations can deal with 
the dilemmas and promote safety as a value among the management and employees.
Nowadays, value based management commitment and an economic perspective are 
seen to have a crucial importance for safety performance. More and more attention 
is paid to the value of safety, what it means for organizations and what kind of con-
sequences it has on organizations, to its employees, performance, reputation and fi-
nancial success. However, as values are abstract basic concepts, our aim was to find 
out how safety values are defined and used in practice by the key operators, espe-
cially higher managers, and how they affect employers’ and employees’ decisions 
and behaviour at the workplace.
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The main objective in this study was to develop a common understanding of how 
safety as a value is defined by a variety of key stakeholders: CEOs/managers, employ-
ee representatives, safety experts, representatives of authorities and of private or so-
cial insurance and researchers. Our literature review showed no common definition 
of what is meant by safety values, value of safety, or safety as a value itself yet exists. 
We identified at least four different uses for ‘safety and value’ in our literature review:
1. ‘Value of safety’ as a monetary worth of safety
2. ‘Value of safety’ as the importance or worth of safety, priority of safety
3. ‘Safety values’ mostly the same as ‘value of safety’, but focusing more on the 
expressions of valuing safety (e.g. Newnam et al. 2012)
4. ‘Safety as a value’ as a core value or implicit value (e.g. Cooper 2001)
Based on our research, we propose the following definition for having safety as an 
organizational value:
 A long-term commitment in having safety integrated as a positive value  
 within all business operations and strategies.
This definition holds three critical elements. First of all, the definition speaks of inte-
gration of safety within all business operations and strategies. That is to say that safe-
ty is taken into consideration and considered an important value within each step or 
process the organization undertakes. Secondly, safety is defined as a positive value. 
This means that safety should not be considered a hindrance to production, but in-
stead a worthwhile value to be achieved alongside the optimization of production. 
Thirdly and lastly, the definition refers to a long-term commitment. This is to distin-
guish between organizations with temporary safety programmes and organizations 
that are truly committed to implementing safety in their business operations.
When safety is truly shared as an organizational value, it is clearly part of “the way we 
do things around here”, whether these ‘things’ refer to strategies (management and 
organization), investments (new technologies or new activities) or personnel devel-
opment. Hence, the existence of a safety culture is an outcome of broad managerial 
organizational processes, touched by the company’s strategy, mission, and practical 
operational decisions. As such, safety as a value should be visible in behaviour, man-
agement communication, and operational processes.
When safety is genuinely an organizational value, this implies that in the organiza-
tion, there is a shared intrinsic motivation to strengthen safety. As a consequence, it 
will not be easily influenced by external pressure, other organizational priorities, or 
specific contexts. This also means that it has a certain meaning for the future. Values 
55
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
that are internalized in people’s minds and organizational cultures will not change 
easily and quickly. It is, of course, important to keep in mind that a value may be on-
ly “espoused” instead of genuinely adopted. Therefore, an important element of hav-
ing safety as an organizational value is that safety should always be considered seri-
ously in all decisions and activities.
An important challenge was identified in economic crises. Apparently safety has the 
tendency to descend on the priority list when ‘day-to-day survival’ comes up. This 
finding is compatible with the well-known “drift to danger” concept, introduced by 
(Rasmussen 1997), which implies that continuous cost reduction efforts may easily 
undermine safety margins.
However, when an organization successfully implements safety as a value, our find-
ings show that this contributes to other highly valued areas within the organization. 
It contributes to good business and better control over production processes, to bet-
ter relationships between the employer and the employees, to the attractiveness of 
the organization in the labour market, it is often appreciated by customers and help 
in the marketing of products, contributes to environmental protection, etc. It seems 
to imply that good safety management is actually an important aspect of good man-
agement.
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4 DISCUSSION
In addition to developing a common understanding of how safety as a value is de-
fined by a variety of key stakeholders – CEOs/managers, employee representatives, 
safety experts, representatives of authorities and of private or social insurance, and 
researchers – we wanted to identify practical dilemmas and bottlenecks in practicing 
safety values, and how organizations can effectively deal with these dilemmas. Here 
we will discuss some of these issues as they were obtained from the results.
4.1 Understanding safety as an organizational value and its 
value to organizations
In organizations, safety is commonly defined as a part of the organizational values. 
However, the CEOs/managers interviewed in this study showed that safety was not 
always mentioned as a core value of the organization, since it was seen so much em-
bedded in the core business (demonstrated in the mission statement) that it was 
not regarded necessary to also include safety explicitly in the company’s core values.
Among CEOs/managers in our study, safety is seen as a priority, more important 
than productivity or anything else; a quality of work/product (sign of expertise, effi-
ciency of production); an investment for employees and the future of the company; 
a goal, but also as an objective: a part of one’s everyday work. Nevertheless, many 
CEOs can only say that safety is priority in their company but cannot give a detailed 
analysis. They continued speaking about the place of safety in meetings of top-lev-
el managers, safety speeches, walk-around checks etc., which are usually thought to 
be included in safety management. However, the sample of CEOs/managers focused 
on safety-oriented companies and therefore these results cannot be generalized to 
all companies.
The experts in the Delphi study regard safety as an organizational value almost only rel-
evant for safety in the organization (occupational and process safety), while there was no 
consensus about taking responsibility for the local community. This is remarkable, be-
cause “the impact of values does not stop at the fence of a production plant or workplace. 
Values have an impact in decision-making, acting and on the behaviour of the manag-
ers and workers that have internalized them. Indeed, in the long run, companies cannot 
be socially responsible externally without being socially responsible internally – and vice 
versa” (Zwetsloot et al. 2013b, based on Zwetsloot and Starren 2004; Snowden 2005).
It can be concluded that safety can be an important aspect of the organizational val-
ues, especially when it refers to its future impact: a company’s long-term ambition to 
improve safety, – a long-term commitment to safety – and future managers that are 
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committed to safety. Safety as an organizational value has two complementary and 
compatible dimensions: safety as a value in itself (intrinsically motivated) and safe-
ty as a value as a factor that contributes to other highly valued areas such as good 
business (extrinsically motivated). Both can be motivating for safety and will lead to 
a commitment to safety improvement. The two types of safety values are likely to 
strengthen each other (synergies).
The importance of safety was also partly based on the demands of the authorities 
or customer and the surrounding society: Legislation and instructions of authori-
ties, information requirements (e.g. audit, accidents reports) of customers, reputation 
among customers and in the society. These reasons were, however, mentioned as sec-
ondary motivations for safety. As one CEO said: “Neither the legislation nor the cus-
tomers set pressure; the company is ahead of them.” It is the companies themselves 
that have the responsibility for safety. Taking care of company reputation was seen 
as one of the factors which motivates companies to do their best in safety.
Based on the literature review done in our study, organizational values have a more 
strategic impact than priorities; thus, ‘safety as a value’ goes beyond ‘safety as a pri-
ority’. As values are more stable over time, they can also be expected to have impli-
cations in organizations for a longer period, as priorities may easily change. There-
fore, the value safety has for organizations can only partly be expressed in monetary 
terms, because issues like “trust, better industrial relations, or avoiding painful con-
versations with relatives of victims” cannot be expressed adequately in monetary 
terms. In other words, safety is an important aspect of corporate social responsibil-
ity, since it has added value for all 3 P’s: Profit, People and Planet. In practice, good 
safety was seen as a sign of a good business, good management, a responsible and 
respected employer, and engaged employees.
Safety as a part of the organizational values, especially when it refers to its future im-
pact, can also be seen as an implication that the company and its managers have a 
long-term ambition to improve safety – a long-term commitment to safety. The lit-
erature review showed that safety values are closely related to organizational culture. 
However, safety culture is a broader concept (also with many definitions), which, in 
addition to values, includes norms, beliefs, practices and principles that can be relat-
ed to safety. The Delphi study showed that safety as a value appears to be synergetic 
with the mentioned business values, such as transparency, trust, justice, innovation, 
responsibility, and, as also agreed in the second round, ‘competetiveness’.
The existence of a safety culture is an outcome of broad managerial organizational pro-
cesses, touched by the company’s strategy, mission, and practical operational decisions. 
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Safety as an organizational value has two complementary and compatible dimensions:
• safety as a value in itself (intrinsically motivated)
• safety as a value as a factor that contributes to other highly valued areas such as 
good business and profit, people and planet (added-values; extrinsically moti-
vated).
These two dimensions of ‘safety as a value’ are clearly complementary, and it seems 
likely that there will be synergy between these two types of safety value. It is very likely 
that companies that have adopted safety as an organizational value will also recognize 
its contributions to other highly valued areas. On the other hand, for companies that 
have not adopted safety as their (core) organizational value, the contributions to other 
highly valued areas, such as its contributions to good business, business continuity and 
customer satisfaction can still be very motivating to commit the organization to safety 
improvement. In this respect, there is a clear relationship with the notions of intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation. These types of motivation are complementary and compati-
ble. In practical situations, the distinction may be somewhat artificial: in many organ-
izations there will be people who dominantly see safety as a value in itself, and other 
people who mainly see safety as a factor that contributes to other highly valued areas 
such as ‘good business’. In both cases, organizations and the people therein may rec-
ognize that safety is important and commit themselves to safety improvement. 
Based on the Delphi survey, safety as an organizational value includes the idea that 
safety is part of personnel’s professional skills. When safety is an organizational val-
ue, it is regarded in everyday business operations and safety also requires long-term 
commitment. When safety is an organizational value, it was seen as part of an organ-
izations’ existing operations, not as a separate function.
The Delphi survey also showed that the business meaning of safety was seen to be 
important when safety is an organizational value, i.e. good safety reflects better re-
lations both in the organization and outside of the organization.
The signs that safety is seen as a value correspond with the characteristics of what safe-
ty as a value is and has.  Safety as a value becomes visible also when it is (explicitly or 
not) well integrated in operational processes, like maintenance, training, procedures, 
the agenda of work meetings the interaction with contractors and investment choices.
4.2 Individual differences in perception of safety
In the interviews, the safety attitudes were seen to be individual-based issues, not re-
lated to, for example, gender. The differences were seen between individuals in every 
group. However, views related to the role of age differed. Some CEOs/managers said 
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that older employees don’t have so good safety values and culture as younger em-
ployees; some saw older employees as opinion leaders. Some said that young em-
ployees might face more accidents, due to lack of skills and lack of understanding 
of risks, and some said that young employees used personal protective equipment 
more often than older ones. However, there are research findings which indicate that 
older workers had the best perceptions of safety (Gyekye and Salminen 2009a).
Some of the interviewed CEOs/managers saw differences in values and safety culture 
between different locations. As Schein 2014 has pointed out, how people view safety 
and how cultural factors impact safety issues are influenced by national cultures and, 
even more importantly, by occupational cultures. In every organization there are sub-
cultures, which have their own subsets of assumption on safety. These subcultures have 
their roots and origins in the occupations and professions, not merely inside the or-
ganization. There are also cultural variations of the occupations in different industries.
The challenges in successfully sharing the safety values of the company in everyday 
work inside the company were related to:
• employees’ attitudes towards safety, complying with regulations and standards
• the dilemma of the costs of best safety available and the financial situation/decision
It seems that the main problems arise when risk is not recognized; that is why em-
ployees continue to work in unsafe ways or situations. To tackle the employees’ atti-
tudes towards safety, different approaches were used. For example:
• motivating the less motivated people was seen as the duty of managers/super-
visors
• use of fast and flexible work habits in the tasks in which safety is required
• paying attention to planning and scheduling, not accepting haste as an ex-
cuse
• “competing” on safety
The challenges related to the surrounding society were:
• (Sub)contractors’ safety values or quality standards: e.g. in the common work-
place, where the habits of different companies do not match
• Country culture: e.g. attitudes towards safety, education
• Global situation: e.g. conflict areas (general safety level in a country)
• The EU directives on governmental tendering: e.g. suppliers are competing on 
price only, and that safety qualities of products and services are not considered
To tackle the inconsistency of a company’s own safety values and requirements and 
the values and requirements of a (sub)contractor, some companies offer safety train-
ing to their contractors or require, for example, a general occupational safety card.
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4.3 Ways, challenges and solutions in practicing safety as a 
value
When safety is truly shared as an organizational value, it is clearly part of ‘the way we 
do things around here’, whether these ‘things’ refer to strategies (management and 
organization), investments (new technologies or new activities) or personnel devel-
opment. Safety as a value is understood through/by means of safety management.
Based on our findings, one can say that an organization that has safety as a core value 
can be recognized by: informal talking and communication about safety, accepting 
boundaries related to safety (and especially unsafety), and initiation of action in the 
case that these boundaries tend to be overruled, even if this takes extra time and ef-
fort. In these kinds of organizations, management communicates actively that safety 
is a value, which is reflected in e.g. setting of priorities, integrating it in all operation-
al processes and decisions, and by showing proper role behaviour regarding safe-
ty. Safety as a value becomes also visible when it is (explicitly or not) well integrated 
in operational processes, like maintenance, training, procedures, the agenda of work 
meetings, the interaction with contractors and investment choices.
It is clear that top managers and supervisors can strengthen safety values by con-
sistent actions.
The CEO/manager interviews showed that the most common ways to share the val-
ue of safety in the workplace are
• communication (regular meetings, different kinds of information material, 
joint discussions)
• training
• continuous development of practices and products
Less commonly mentioned ways were, for example, the use of safety bonuses. Also 
the Delphi study raised the unclear role of reward/compensation systems: there was 
no consensus if safety as a value is reflected – or is not – in the compensation sys-
tems which show the complexity of having safety as a part of a compensation system. 
The reasons for this can be various. For example, the compensation of safety doesn’t 
need to be formally included in a compensation system; maybe informal rewards can 
be very effective, too.  On the other hand, safety as part of a compensation system 
may be a great motivator but the complexity also arises when considering the indi-
cators of safety. Moreover, this is dependent on the formal policies of the company 
or branch. Anyway, the compensation of safety divides opinions.
The Delphi survey reveals that, when safety is considered to be an organizational val-
61
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
ue, it means that safety can be seen in practical everyday operations. Thus, safety 
as an organizational value reflects safety culture and safety behaviour at work – on 
all organization levels. This finding shows us that safety as a value is not only an ab-
stract concept.
It is important to distinguish between values that are really shared and lived-up to, 
and espoused values, which are mainly communicated verbally and in writing.  When 
there is a difference between the two, employees will not believe the espoused val-
ues. Employees look at safety values in more practical way than managers and often 
do not share the same safety values as managers. This is understandable because 
employees face the everyday concrete safety issues while working; meanwhile man-
agers have a wider overlook across the entire organization.
Both the literature review and the interviews done in the study show that sharing the 
value of safety with everyone in the workplace is not easy. According to the inter-
views, the challenges inside the company were related to:
• employees’ attitudes towards safety, complying with the regulations and 
norms
• the dilemma of the costs of best safety available and the financial situation/decision
This challenge of national/occupational/company based culture was identified in the CEO/
manager interviews, as they recognized that the surrounding society, that is (sub)contrac-
tors’ safety values or quality standards (e.g. in the common workplace, where the habits of 
different companies do not match) or country culture (e.g. attitudes towards safety, edu-
cation) affect how safety values are viewed and put into action. To tackle the inconsisten-
cy of a company’s own safety values and requirements and the values and requirements of 
a (sub)contractor, some companies offer safety training to their contractors or require, for 
example, a general occupational safety card. This organization’s effort to influence value of 
safety outside the company can be seen as an act related to corporate social responsibili-
ty. The company is seen to be responsible for taking care of human well-being (both their 
health and safety), families of employees and society.
From a practical point of view it seems that the main dilemmas/problems for organ-
izations is that risk is not recognized and that’s why employees continue to work in 
unsafe ways or situations. To tackle the employees’ attitudes towards safety, differ-
ent approaches were used.
The CEOs/managers mentioned for example:
• motivating the less motivated people was seen as the duty of managers/supervi-
sors
• use of fast and flexible work habits in the tasks in which safety is required
62
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
• paying attention to planning and scheduling, not accepting haste as an excuse
• “competing” on safety
The dilemma of the costs of best safety available and the financial situation/decision 
is also recognized widely, both in research literature and in practice. Line managers 
have to manage the dual goals of productivity/efficiency and safety. If a productivi-
ty schema is more salient and important in the thinking of individual managers, they 
may over-emphasize productivity and under-emphasize safety (Colley and Neal 2012).
The interviewed CEOs/managers for example recognized that the high ambitions on 
professionalism and craftsmanship sometimes leads to frustration, e.g. in case of dis-
appointments when things don’t work out because of planning/money issues. This 
can be a trigger for unsafe acts. Also the need to innovate and finding new ways of 
working can be exciting and unsafe at the same time. Finding the right balance in 
these issues was seen as a challenge.
From the researchers’ point of view, the companies involved in the study were in a 
different stage in their safety, and in building their safety culture. As one company 
was building its safe working environment – “the basic things” – some others were 
modifying their safety culture towards individual involvement: “safety as everyone’s 
core attitude”. This difference was shown in what the companies did to share the val-
ue of safety among their managers and employees. For example, how the values of 
the company were formed and discussed with employees: were they given or formu-
lated together with employees?
Sharing and managing values and integrating organizational and individual values 
are real challenges (e.g. Paarlberg and Perry 2007). Some mechanisms have been 
found that strengthen safety values. For example, supervisor safety practices are as-
sociated with stronger safety values (Newnam et al. 2012). Colley and Neal (2012) 
presented that bottlenecks in transferring and reinforcing the safety message may 
occur because of the communication styles and differing values of supervisors. Paarl-
berg and Perry (2007) described that the process of aligning values should be a social 
process between employees, managers, and even customers and other stakeholders. 
Values should not be defined by the top management alone, but with the employees.
Often, managers talk about how safety as a value is shown in practice. They are not 
talking about how the values of their organization are defined. It seems there is no 
discussion with personnel when setting values; neither is there discussion on what 
kind of culture or practices are expected based on the values set. When aiming to 
have safety as a (core) value, organizations could use the knowledge and experienc-
es of mechanisms that help to share and manage values, based on general values re-
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search, e.g. defining the values and their practical implications with employees (and 
other stakeholders); exploiting the middle management as integrators between in-
dividual values and organization’s practices; resourcing, communicating and reward-
ing in line with the values defined etc. (e.g. Paarlberg and Perry 2007).
One possible way to solve challenges that are connected to value discussion in work-
ing life is to bring virtues as developing tools in organizations. Values and virtues are 
closely related to each other, but unlike values, virtues have to come true also in prac-
tice to be alive (Kylliäinen 2012). Where the values are ideals that are hoped to instruct 
activities, virtues cannot be talked about until the ideals have come true. Virtues do 
not replace the values in working life. An organization needs to function both well 
and right. Values direct the future and instruct the development; all the good things 
that happen here and now are on the basis of virtues. 
There are several safety related values that are important for developing or support-
ing safety practices and/or safety culture. The most well-known are justice (Dekker 
2007; Reason 1997), trust and informedness (Reason 1997). Trust between manag-
ers and employees as well as a “just culture” seem to be necessary preconditions for 
the spread of safety values. Based on the analysis of Zwetsloot et al. (2013b) on core 
values, there are three types of values that support safety, namely values related to:
1. “being” – that is, to individuals and their attitudes (interconnectedness, parti-
cipation and trust)
2. “doing” – that is, actions planned or undertaking (justice and responsibility)
3. “becoming” – that is, the alignment of personal and organizational develop-
ment (growth and resilience)
Priorities often depend on the circumstances. Safety as a priority may change when 
the organization meets external threats. However, when safety is a shared value, it is 
part of the identity of the organization to always operate in a safe manner, even un-
der difficult conditions. A comprehensive view of the value of safety could thus help 
organizations to improve their resilience (Hollnagel et al. 2006), especially when safe-
ty is the core value of organization.
When both top management and employees had internalized safety as top priority, 
they saw unanimously the way out of the crisis which they had met. An organization 
with consensus about safety values is also stronger to meet external threats.
4.4 Zero accident vision and beyond
As mentioned in the literature review, Cooper (2001) has stated that the idea of ‘safe-
ty is a value’ is based on the “fundamental philosophy that all injuries are prevent-
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able and that the goal of zero injuries can be achieved” and a safe working place is 
nowadays seen as a fundamental right.
Interestingly, concerning the ethical justification of safety as an organizational value, 
the Delphi study did not show consensus on zero accidents being the only justified 
goal for safety policy. Respectively, there was no consensus on the ideas that all seri-
ous accidents can be prevented or that all minor accidents are preventable.
One possible explanation for non-consensus on having zero accidents as the only 
justified goal is that zero accident can be understood as a numerical goal rather than 
a philosophy. Numerical goals for safety divide opinions and this may be the case 
here. Preventing all serious and all minor accidents may as well have the non-con-
sensus because of the general thinking that someday an accident may occur regard-
less of all the preventive work. However, the Delphi survey showed that safety values 
were seen as important both on the moral and operative levels.
When linking safety as a value to zero vision, safety should not only be seen as a num-
ber, a target or an outcome of technical competence, it is more and more seen as a 
crucial value that is a part of, or even defines, a corporate culture.
Another interesting result was that the panelists did not agree whether it is charac-
teristic – when having safety as an organizational value – that organizations take re-
sponsibility for the local community, or people communicate about safety issues out-
side of work. However, some companies are already promoting and sharing value of 
safety further than just in their organizations or working hours, by e.g. lending safety 
equipment to employees, supporting and encouraging people to act safely in their 
free time. We could ask, is the ‘zero accidents’ goal enough in the future, or is there 
a need for a more advanced mindset for safety, extending the concept of safety be-
yond the zero, covering the shared responsibility for safety and aiming to have safe-
ty as a value in every walk of life?
4.5 Limitations of the study
The main focus of the literature review was to generate information for defining the content 
of interviews and the Delphi study. Therefore, we did not perform a systematic review, but 
more like an exploratory review. The exploratory review might exclude some publications re-
lated to the topic; however, it is considered to be adequate for the purpose of this research.
There are some limitations concerning the generalization of the results of the inter-
views. For the interviews, we purposely selected the interviewees from companies 
which are already on their way with the “value of safety” discussions, to be able to 
get information on the dilemmas as well as practices they have had.
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The Delphi study has some limitations. The Delphi study is the best option to create 
consensus, and come-up with a definition of the value of safety as an organization-
al value, and of the factors relevant for the (added) value of safety. However, con-
cerning the influencing factors, visibility and ethical justifications, other forms of re-
search design would be more suitable than a Delphi study, which is based on expert 
opinions. However, such studies could not be very fruitful in the absence of consen-
sus of what it means when safety is a value, or what (added) values safety can have 
for organizations.  Now that there is consensus on these two basic issues, further re-
search on influencing factors, expressions of the value of safety, and ethical justifica-
tions can be more fruitfully undertaken. The last three perspectives were explored in 
this Delphi study, in order to generate a first framework, and so a set of hypotheses 
on what influencing factors, expressions of safety as a value, and ethical justifications 
are most relevant for further research. In this study, we used two complementary re-
search methods to address this limitation of the Delphi study.
Secondly, although the involvement of the various types of stakeholders is in itself 
satisfactory, this is much less the case with their geographical origin: Europeans were 
very dominant. As values, and their interpretations, are influenced by national cul-
tures, we cannot be sure that panel participants from other continents would have 
generated the same outcomes.
4.6 Recommendations for future research
There are several interesting issues where future research is needed. Since we have a 
consensus on what it means when safety is an organizational value, it is important to 
follow up with research concerning the relationship between ‘safety as a value’ and 
safety culture, as well as ‘safety as a value’ and business ethics. Another interesting 
question that future research might address is exploring what makes some compa-
nies adopt safety as a value, while others do not.
In addition, there were some questions we did not get answer to in this study: What is 
the role of the local community, since there was no consensus about taking responsi-
bility for the local community? Further research has to find out what the issues are re-
lated to being responsible and safe externally, since safety, of course, doesn’t stop at 
the fence of the workplace. Also the relationship between safety at home and safety 
in the workplace could need a closer look, since this was not always valued equally. 
The question of whether or not safety as a value should or could be reflected in the 
compensation systems remains open, as well as the ambition of Zero vision as an eth-
ical justification, since this clearly is an area where safety experts do disagree. A first 
step might be further clarifications on the concept of ‘zero accidents’.
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5 INTRODUCTION
This study is the second part of the Value of Safety (VALOSA) research project. The 
first part of this project consisted of a literature review, interviews with CEOs and sen-
ior managers, and a Delphi study of several stakeholder groups. The second part of 
the project consisted of interviews at the supervisor and worker levels, as well as the 
“Organizational values and valuing safety at work” survey carried out in three Finn-
ish companies. 
In the first part of our project, we revealed that there is no unanimous definition of 
safety as an organizational value. Through the Delphi study, we were able to devel-
op a consensus on what it means when safety is a true organizational value, togeth-
er with a consensus on what the potential benefits of safety as a value are, what fac-
tors influence it,  and how it can be recognized in practice. 
Based on our literature review, the top managers and supervisors can strengthen 
safety as a value through consistent actions, and it is important to distinguish be-
tween values that are really shared and lived up to, and espoused values, which are 
mainly communicated verbally and in writing. If there is a conflict between the shared 
values and espoused values, employees will not believe the espoused values.
The CEOs and top managers from several European forerunner companies whom we 
interviewed in the first part of the research identified good safety as a sign of good 
business and management, a responsible and respected employer, and engaged em-
ployees. They saw safety as a priority and as quality of work, and also as an invest-
ment for workers and the future of the organization. According to the CEOs, safety as 
a value was shared most commonly through communication: meetings, safety walks, 
campaigns, etc., as well as through safety training and an open climate for new ideas 
and reporting accidents and near misses. The CEOs emphasized the role of the be-
haviour of management and supervisors, which was also identified in the literature 
review. As the challenges related to sharing safety as a value and safety at work, CE-
Os and managers mentioned, for example, the employees’ attitudes and motivation 
towards safety, the dilemma between safety and costs, and the need for new inno-
vations when it comes to ways of working.
In the second part of our research, using data gained from the literature review, the 
CEO interviews, and the Delphi study, we developed the “Organizational values and 
valuing safety at work” survey. In addition, we carried out interviews with employees 
and supervisors in order to identify any other aspects related to safety as an organ-
izational value. The aim of our survey was to study 1) how safety is valued in differ-
ent organizational groups, 2) what kind of value conflicts come up in everyday work, 
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decision-making and value communication, 3) how organizations promote and share 
the safety as a value in practice, and 4) what factors in companies and organizations 
can strengthen safety as a value.
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6 INTERVIEWS WITH SUPERVISORS AND 
EMPLOYEES
6.1 Participants
We carried out ten group interviews in two of the three companies participating the 
value questionnaire. The group interviews were held in June 2015. Altogether 32 per-
sons participated in the group interviews: 12 supervisors, 12 employees and 8 inter-
viewees from the safety organization.
6.2 Implementation of the group interviews
The interviews were theme interviews with 2-5 interviewees. The aim of the inter-
views was to provide information 1) to develop the value questionnaire and 2) to bet-
ter understand and interpret the results from the value questionnaire. The interviews 
consisted of following themes:
1. Organizational values and their visibility at the workplace
2. The value of safety and exposing it at the workplace
3. Value-related conflicts at work
4. Needs for improvements concerning safety
5. Your own role in safety matters (only for the safety organization)
The interviewer had elaborative questions for each theme. The duration of the inter-
views varied from one to two hours. The results of the group interviews are described 
at a general level for reasons of privacy protection.
6.3 Main observations from the group interviews
Both companies had defined their organizational values, with safety being one of the 
values of both companies. The factors interviewees considered to improve safety in-
cluded the following:
• open discussion/communication and emphasizing safety matters
• anticipating safety, risk assessments 
• continuous training and orientation
• in-work safety management practices (safety observations system, safety 
walks, safe tools and equipment, etc.)
The factors mentioned by the interviewees as weakening safety included:
• inadequate/over-optimistic planning and scheduling, not updating the sched-
ules after delays due to other quarters 
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• supervisors hurrying employees
• perceptions of haste; temptation to take a short cut in safety instructions or 
choose a faster but less safe way of work
• poor design of the work environment, processes or equipment
The ways safety as a value was communicated according to the interviewees included:
• safety information (safety bulletin, safety info emails)
• safety training and other events, safety matters as a part of weekly meet-
ings, etc.
• encouraging employees to report safety-related problems
• rewarding based on safety matters
• Some of the interviewees considered safety to be communicated mostly 
through events and bulleting, and not so much in everyday work.
With regard to value-related conflicts, the interviewees pointed out the following, 
for example:
• time pressure/efficiency vs. safety: middle/top managers or customers do 
not necessarily understand what or how long it takes to perform a certain 
task safely
• competing safeties, e.g. occupational safety vs. process safety
• planning and developing safety procedures/instructions at work are not par-
ticipative
• impossible instructions or requirements
• supervisors/managers do not always intervene in unsafe actions or safety de-
ficiencies they have noticed
As regards ways to improve safety, the interviewees suggested the following, for in-
stance:
• better devices for work, safer equipment
• a genuinely responsive and open atmosphere for employees’ ideas and sug-
gestions for safety and work
• more participative safety development
• decreasing perceptions of haste.
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7 “ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES AND SAFETY AS A 
VALUE” SURVEY
7.1 Participants
The sample was gathered from three Finnish companies operating in different fields 
of industry: construction, chemical industry, and paper industry. The survey took 
place between September and December 2015, depending on the company. The 
surveys were filled out using the Digium digital survey tool or in paper format. Alto-
gether 2804 individuals were approached in order to participate in the survey. In to-
tal, 1362 individuals responded, representing a response rate of 49 %.
Eighty-six percent of the respondents were male and 14% female. Most of the re-
spondents belonged to the age group of 45-54 years (Figure 7.1).
Figure 7.1 Respondents by age group.
Twenty-four percent of the respondents had a supervisory position, while 76% were 
working in a non-supervisory position. The average age of the respondents was 44 
years (SD=12). The personnel groups of respondents are presented in Figure 7.2.
5 %
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Figure 7.2 Respondents by personnel group.
Most of the respondents had 11-20 years of work experience (Figure 7.3). Only around 
one out of ten respondents had work experience of two years or less.
Figure 7.3 Respondents by work experience.
Most of the respondents (90%) had a permanent employment position, while 10% 
were working with a temporary contract.
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7.2 Survey method
7.2.1 The content of the survey
The “Organizational values and valuing safety at work” survey was developed in this 
study by combining existing survey methods with new items generated for this study. 
The survey was intentionally compiled to be quite extensive, in order to identify the 
different aspects related to safety as a value and the value of safety in organizations. 
We constructed the survey with ten different sections, covering personal values, work 
values, and items describing how safety is valued by respondents themselves and 
how respondents consider their supervisors, managers and co-workers to value safe-
ty. We also included items describing ways of sharing and communicating safety as 
a value, as well as the barriers preventing individuals from acting safely in everyday 
work. The content of the survey is presented in Table 7.1.
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Table 7.1 The content of the “Organizational values and valuing safety at work” survey.
Section Method and focus
Organizational unit Respondent’s working unit
Background  
information
Year of birth, sex, personnel group, educational background, superviso-
ry role, work experience, type of employment, Occupational Safety Card 
Accidents and near 
misses
Accidents involving oneself and colleagues/subordinates, reporting near 
misses, effective ways to prevent accidents
Safety activities at 
the workplace
Items describing the safety performance and activities in everyday work 
at the individual, group, management, and organizational levels. 
5-point Likert scale, where 1=fully disagree and 5=fully agree.
Valuing safety at the 
workplace 
Items describing the employer’s motives for safety and the value of sa-
fety, and social responsibility for the safety of the employees, environ-
ment and community. 
5-point Likert scale, where 1=fully disagree and 5=fully agree.
Safety and risk 
perceptions at the 
workplace
Items describing the risk perceptions and motivations for safety. 
5-point Likert scale, where 1=fully disagree and 5=fully agree.
Practical safety  
challenges
Items describing the value conflicts in everyday work, decision-making 
and value communication.
5-point Likert scale, where 1=fully disagree and 5=fully agree.
Typical working  
conditions and  
circumstances at 
work
Frequency of typical straining work conditions and circumstances. The 
scale consisted of twelve items from the SUJUVA scales (Kalakoski et al 
2012) concerning typical human errors and straining work conditions.
5-point Likert scale: 5=daily, 4=weekly, 3=monthly, 2=yearly, 1=never.
Work-related  
values
The Work Value Survey (Ros, Schwartz & Surkiss 1999) was used to stu-
dy the work-related values of the participants.
5-point Likert scale, where 1=not important at all, and 5=very impor-
tant.
Values in life 21-item version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (Schwartz & Bils-
ky, 1987, 1990; Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, & Harris, 2001; 
Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; Schwartz, 1992, 1994) with two additional items 
concerning safety at work.
6-point Likert scale, where 1=Not like me at all, 2=Not like me,  
3=A little like me, 4=Somewhat like me, 5=Like me, 6=Very much like me
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To study the participants’ basic values in life, we used the 21-item version of the Por-
trait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990; Schwartz, Melech, 
Lehmann, Burgess, & Harris, 2001; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; Schwartz, 1992, 1994) 
with two additional items concerning safety at work. The items added to the origi-
nal questionnaire were:
• Safety at work is important to him/her. He/she wants his/her employer to en-
sure that working is safe.
• It is important for him/her to work safely in every situation. He/she tries to 
avoid safety risks at work. 
To measure respondents’ values at work, we used the Work Value Survey (WVS) (Ros, 
Schwartz & Surkiss 1999). 
Twelve items were selected from the SUJUVA survey (Kalakoski et al. 2012), describ-
ing typical straining work conditions and typical human errors at work.
7.2.2 Statistical methods
Factor analysis with initial extraction rotation was used to determinate sum of the var-
iables, excluding PVQ and WVS. Since the items of the new sections of the question-
naire were not based on a single theory but on several theoretical approaches and 
findings, there was no single theoretical motivation to find certain subscales. There-
fore, exploratory factor analysis was chosen in order to discover a factorial structure 
that is statistically, theoretically, and practically justifiable. The reliability of the sums 
was measured by counting Cronbach’s α-values. The Pearson correlation coefficient 
was calculated for the sum of the variables. The association between work injuries 
and the sum of the variables was analyzed with binary logistic regression. Linear re-
gression analysis was used for continuous variables. All analyses were adjusted for 
sex, age and education. One-Way ANOVA with Bonferroni ad-hoc tests were used to 
analyze the differences between different respondent groups.’
7.3 Findings and discussion
7.3.1 Dimensions for valuing safety
Based on the factor analysis, we ended up with 19 subscales. These are presented in 
Table 7.2. Perceptions of workplace safety values are transmitted across levels of the 
organization, but on the other hand, different organizational groups have different 
perspectives on safety as a value, and therefore also tend to have different ways es-
pousing safety as their value. (See e.g. Colley and Neal 2012; Salminen and Koivula 
2006.) In our study, we have categorized the subscales based on the organizational 
level that the subscale mainly describes. For example, “Acting safely is not support-
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ed in everyday work” indicates that the prerequisites for valuing safety are not pro-
vided by the organization and/or employer (see Table 7.2).
Table 7.2 The subscales of the survey based on the factor analysis.
Factor Organizational 
level
Items Cronbach’s 
α
Theme
Organization values safety in or-
der to avoid negative outcomes
Organization / 
Employer
3 α=0.854 Motivations for 
safety (SV1)
Organization values safety in or-
der to pursue positive outcomes
Organization / 
Employer
4 α=0.872
Organization has an extensive in-
terest in safety
Organization / 
Employer
3 α=0.894
Safety personnel is active Safety person-
nel
3 α=0.920 Support for safety 
performance (SV2)
Safety training is useful Organization 3 α=0.879
Acting safely is not supported in 
everyday work
Organization / 
Management
5 α=0.799
Safety deviations are handled ac-
tively
Organization / 
Management
3 α=0.895
The management’s safety com-
munication is open and active
Management 3 α=0.918 Management’s ac-
tions and priori-
ties regarding sa-
fety (SV3)
Safety is not the management’s 
priority
Management 6 α=0.901
The management participates 
and involves employees
Management 3 α=0.909
Supervisors ignoring safety Supervisors 3 α=0.913 Supervisors’ actions 
and priorities regar-
ding safety (SV4)
Supervisors showing their  
responsibility
Supervisors 3 α=0.944
Supervisors showing a good 
example and encouraging  
employees in safety matters
Supervisors 5 α=0.908
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Acting safely is valued in the 
work community
Work group / 
Organization
2 α=0.936 Valuing safety at 
the work-group 
level (SV5)Employees are acting for the 
common safety
Work group 3 α=0.862
Safety is ignored in work-group 
level
Work group 3 α=0.770
The value of safety is not re-
cognized by individuals
Individual 6 α=0.805 Valuing safety at 
the individual le-
vel (SV6)Individuals are committed to 
work safely
Individual 5 α=0.874
Concerned about getting in an 
accident at work
Individual 2 α=0.823 Concerned about 
getting in an acci-
dent at work (SV7)
The internal consistencies (Cronbach’s alpha based on standardized items) for most 
of the subscales (17/19) were at least at a good level (α≥0.8) and for 2 subscales at 
an acceptable level (0.7≥α>0.8). 
7.3.2 Values in life
The Portrait Values Questionnaire was used to measure the personal values of re-
spondents, and it resulted in good internal consistencies (α = 0.756…0.939) for the 
scale and its subscales. The means and standard deviations of the subscales for the 
questionnaire are presented in Table 7.3, as well as differences between personnel 
groups. 
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Table 7.3 The means and standard deviation of Portrait Values Questionnaire subscales, and differences 
between personnel groups. The answering scale was: 1: Not important at all … 5: Very important.
Portrait Values 
Questionnaire
N Mean St. dev. Cron-
bach’s α
Differences between personnel 
groups
Security  
(J5, J15)
1230 4.23 1.066 α=0.845 Senior officials/upper management 
scored significantly lower than ot-
her groups.
Conformity  
(J7, J17)
1224 3.96 1.059 α=0.859 Worker-level employees scored sig-
nificantly lower than upper-level 
employees and clerical employees.
Tradition  
(J9, J21)
1229 3.62 1.015 α=0.756 No differences between groups.
Benevolence 
(J13, J19)
1243 4.74 0.892 α=0.892 Worker-level employees scored sig-
nificantly lower than clerical emp-
loyees.
Universalism 
(J3, J8, J20)
1248 4.47 0.933 α=0.849 Worker-level employees scored sig-
nificantly lower than upper-level 
employees.
Self-direction 
(J1, J12)
1239 3.94 0.979 α=0.817 Worker-level employees scored sig-
nificantly lower than other groups.
Stimulation  
(J6, J16)
1231 3.54 1.034 α=0.852 No differences between groups.
Hedonism  
(J10, J22)
1235 3.79 1.132 α=0.919 No differences between groups.
Achievement  
(J4, J14)
1233 3.20 1.130 α=0.908 Worker-level employees scored sig-
nificantly lower than other groups.
Power  
(J2, J18)
1236 2.80 1.014 α=0.846 Worker-level employees scored sig-
nificantly lower than other groups.
Occupational  
Safety  
(J11, J23)
1239 5.05 0.905 α=0.939 Worker-level employees scored sig-
nificantly lower than upper-level 
employees and clerical employees.
On average, the most highly scored personal values were occupational safety, which 
was added to the original scale, and benevolence. The most lowly-scored items were 
power and hedonism. Interestingly, the worker-level employees scored significantly 
lower than upper-level and clerical employees on the occupational safety factor, how-
ever there was no significant difference between workers and senior officials/upper 
management concerning the occupational safety factor. 
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7.3.3 Work-related values
The Work Value Survey was used to measure respondents’ work-related values. The 
survey resulted in good internal consistencies (α= 0.819…0.875). The standard devi-
ations of the subscales are presented in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4 The means and deviations of the Work Value Scale, and differences between personnel groups.
Work Value Survey N Mean St. dev. Cronbach’s 
α
Differences between  
personnel groups
Extrinsic work values 
(I1, I2)
1268 4.40 .658 α=0.875 Worker-level employees valued 
significantly higher than senior 
officials/upper management.
Intrinsic work values 
(I3, I6)
1262 4.06 .713 α=0.819 Worker-level employees valued 
significantly lower than other 
groups.
Social work values 
(I4, I7, I9)
1270 3.70 .780 α=0.850 Worker-level employees valued 
significantly lower than other 
groups.
Prestige work values 
(I5, I8)
1256 3.03 .856 α=0.828 Clerical employees valued sig-
nificantly lower than upper-le-
vel employees.
On average, the extrinsic work values were considered most important and the pres-
tige work values least important. The only work value factor that worker-level em-
ployees valued higher than other personnel groups was extrinsic values.
7.3.4 How safety is valued in the organizations
Three subscales described the motivations for safety (Figure 7.4). Around four out 
of five of the respondents at least partly agreed that their organization values safe-
ty in order to pursue positive outcomes (e.g. to improve the organization’s compet-
itiveness or image) and has an extensive interest in safety (e.g. promoting safety at 
the industry level). Seven out of ten respondents at least partly agreed that the mo-
tivation for safety is to avoid negative outcomes (e.g. avoiding sanctions or costs). 
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Figure 7.4 Organization’s motivations for safety.
The management’s actions and priorities regarding safety were measured using three 
subscales (Figure 7.5) and almost nine out of ten respondents at least partly agreed 
that the management’s safety communication is open and active (e.g. management 
openly talks about safety issues). Three out of four respondents at least partly agreed 
that the management participates and involves employees in safety matters (e.g. 
management holds safety walk-arounds on a regular basis). Less than one third of the 
respondents at least partly agreed that safety is not the management’s priority (e.g. 
top management talks about safety but the commitment is not shown in practice, or 
the rewarding systems are based on financial matters, not on safety).
Figure 7.5 Management’s actions and priorities in safety.
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Three subscales measured supervisors’ actions and priorities in safety (Figure 7.6). 
Around eight out of ten respondents at least partly agreed that supervisors show a 
good example and encourage employees in safety matters (e.g. encouraging report-
ing on safety deviations and being exemplary in safety), and that supervisors show 
their responsibility when it comes to safety. Less than one third of the respondents 
at least partly agreed that supervisors ignore safety matters (e.g. supervisors agree-
ing to take risks when the schedule is tight). 
Figure 7.6 Supervisors’ actions and priorities in safety.
Four subscales measured support for safety performance (Figure 7.7). Around four 
out of five respondents at least partly agreed that safety deviations are handled ac-
tively (e.g. the actions decided on after incidents are always implemented). Around 
seven out of ten respondents at least partly agreed that safety personnel is active, 
and that safety training is useful. Around every fourth respondent at least partly 
agreed that acting safety is not supported in everyday work (e.g. not obtaining suit-
able tools for safe working or too tight schedules leading to unsafe work).
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Figure 7.7 Support for safety performance.
Three of the subscales measured how safety is valued at the work-group level (Fig-
ure 7.8). Over nine out of ten respondents at least partly agreed that acting safely is 
valued in the work community (e.g. people working here value a high level of safety 
performance). Around eight out of ten respondents at least partly agreed that em-
ployees are acting for the common safety (e.g. co-workers intervene if someone is 
working unsafely). Only 2% totally agreed and 12% partly agreed that safety is ig-
nored at the work-group level (e.g. work group sometimes taking a short cut with 
safety procedures).
Figure 7.8 Valuing safety at the work-group level.
Our survey had two subscales describing how individuals value safety (Figure 7.9). 
36%
47%
42%
39%
19%
35%
31%
17%
17%
13%
19%
7%
19% 40%
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Safety training is useful
Acting safely is not supported in everyday work
Safety deviations are handled actively
Safety personnel is active
Support for safety performance
Fully agree Partly agree Neither agree nor disagree Partly disagree Fully disagree
38 %
53 %
45 %
39 %
12 %
11 %
15 % 29 % 42 %
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Employees are acting for the common safety
Acting safely is valued in the work community
Safety is ignored at the work-group level
Valuing safety at the work-group level
Fully Agree Partly agree Neither agree nor disagree Partly disagree Fully disagree
83
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
More than nine out of ten respondents at least partly agreed that they are commit-
ted to working safely (e.g. working safely even when not supervised). Less than one 
out of ten respondents at least partly agreed that the value of safety is not recog-
nized by individuals (e.g. working safely requires too much effort).
Figure 7.9 Valuing safety at the individual level.
Our analyses showed that there were significant differences (p=0.000-0.009) be-
tween supervisors’ and non-supervisors’ opinions regarding every factor describing 
how safety is valued in the organization, with non-supervisors being more critical 
than supervisors. The summary of the analyses is presented in Table 7.5. For exam-
ple, non-supervisors considered significantly more often that safety is not a priority 
for management and that supervisors are ignoring safety. However, the non-super-
visors were also more critical towards group and individual-level factors.
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Table 7.5 Differences between non-supervisors’ and supervisors’ views concerning safety as a value in their 
organization (higher scores bolded, reversed scales marked with an asterisk (*); a lower mean is better.).
Non-supervisor Supervisor Total ANOVA
Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Sig.
The organization has an 
extensive interest in safety
4.101 922 .8045 4.420 295 .6078 4.178 1217 .7734 0.000
The organization values 
safety in order to pursue 
positive outcomes
4.233 922 .6953 4.485 295 .5478 4.294 1217 .6711 0.000
The organization values 
safety in order to avoid 
negative outcomes *
3.897 922 .8877 3.649 295 .9640 3,837 1217 .9126 0.000
The management par-
ticipates and involves 
employees
3.889 918 .8858 4.212 294 .8095 3.968 1212 .8785 0.000
Safety is not the  
management’s priority *
2.742 905 .9728 2.243 295 .9222 2.619 1200 .9840 0.000
The management’s sa-
fety communication is 
open and active
4.335 922 .7363 4.593 296 .5509 4.398 1218 .7043 0.000
Supervisors show a good 
example and encourage 
employees in safety  
matters
4.083 918 .7527 4.391 294 .5875 4.158 1212 .7280 0.000
Supervisors ignore safety * 2.459 922 1.1298 1.937 295 .9602 2.333 1217 1.1135 0.000
Supervisors show their 
responsibility
4.154 921 .8433 4.465 296 .5970 4.230 1217 .8014 0.000
Safety personnel is active 3.950 919 .9338 4.238 295 .7764 4.020 1214 .9062 0.000
Safety deviations are 
handled actively
4.182 921 .7730 4.411 295 .5961 4.237 1216 .7403 0.000
Acting safely is not sup-
ported in everyday 
work *
2.373 903 .8350 2.120 295 .7130 2.310 1198 .8137 0.000
Safety training is useful 3.919 920 .8034 4.236 295 .6985 3.996 1215 .7907 0.000
Safety is ignored at the 
work-group level *
2.069 908 .7872 1.933 295 .7243 2.035 1203 .7742 0.009
Acting safely is valued in 
the work community 
4.381 917 .6563 4.599 294 .5279 4.434 1211 .6342 0.000
Employees are acting for 
the common safety
4.106 918 .6870 4.323 295 .5551 4.159 1213 .6637 0.000
Individuals are committed 
to working safely
4.555 908 .5219 4.661 295 .3990 4.581 1203 .4965 0.001
The value of safety is not 
recognized by individuals
1.858 908 .6804 1.627 295 .5164 1.801 1203 .6515 0.000
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In addition, one subscale described how concerned respondents are about getting 
into an accident at work Figure 7.10 In total, 23% of respondents in non-superviso-
ry positions and 14% of respondents in supervisory positions at least partly agreed 
that they were concerned about getting into accidents.
Figure 7.10 Concerned about getting into an accident at work.
7.3.5 Negative safety outcomes
Roughly one out of ten of the respondents have had an accident in the last three 
years. A total of 28% reported that either their co-worker or subordinate had had a 
serious accident at some point. 
Three subscales were used to measure the human errors occurring at work, and three 
subscales to measure straining working conditions respondents are facing Figure 
7.11 and Figure 7.12.
24 %
27 %
26 %
15 %
7 %
36 %
32 %
18 %
10 %
4 %
0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 %
Fully disagree
Partly disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Partly agree
Fully agree
Concerned about getting in an accident at work
Supervisory position Non-supervisory position
86
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
Figure 7.11 Human errors occurring at work.
Figure 7.12 Straining work conditions.
The most common human error was difficulties in prioritizing and decision-mak-
ing, which was faced at least weekly by every fifth respondent. Excessive workload 
or time pressure was the most common straining work condition, with more than 
every third of the respondents suffering from it at least weekly. The frequency of 
human errors and straining working conditions can be considered weak signals for 
safety problems.
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7.4 Value conflicts and practical problems affecting safety in 
everyday work
In our survey, we studied the possible value conflicts and practical problems concerning 
valuing safety. We questioned the participants on how much they feel that different fac-
tors are in decision-making and everyday work, in order to identify the possibly compet-
ing values (Figure 7.13). We discovered that non-supervisors felt that the three most im-
portant values (based on the average scores) were 1) productivity, 2) cost efficiency, and 
3) occupational safety. Among supervisors, the same three values were at the top, but in 
a different order: 1) occupational safety, 2) productivity, and 3) cost efficiency.
Figure 7.13 How different factors are valued in decision-making and everyday work; non-supervisors vs. 
supervisors (5-point Likert scale where 1= very little and 5 = very much).
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As regards the items indicating that safety is not supported in everyday work, the 
most common issues among non-supervisors were that it is sometimes impossible to 
follow safety instructions, customers/partners do not understand the requirements 
for safe work, and the schedules set by others lead to safety matters being ignored. 
The supervisors, too, felt that customers/partners do not understand the require-
ments for safe work. (Figure 7.14)
Figure 7.14 The average scores concerning items indicating that safety is not supported in everyday work; 
non-supervisors vs. supervisors (5-point Likert scale where 1 = totally disagree and 5 = totally agree; a 
lower score is better).
7.5 Ways to improve safety at work
We asked the respondents how effective different means are in order to improve 
safety at work. Table 7.6 shows the significant differences between supervisors’ and 
non-supervisors’ perceptions.
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Table 7.6 Ways to improve safety at work
Very  
efficient
Rather 
efficient
Not so 
efficient
Difference between 
supervisors and 
non-supervisors
Improving own attitude
supervisors
non-supervisors
61%
79%
56%
32%
18%
36%
7%
3%
8%
Supervisors consider 
this more efficient than 
non-supervisors
Improving the safety climate
supervisors
non-supervisors
52%
60%
49%
43%
39%
44%
5%
1%
6%
Supervisors consider 
this more efficient than 
non-supervisors
Improving introduction/orienta-
tion
50% 43% 7%
Better tools, machines or equipment
supervisors
non-supervisors
50%
40%
53%
42%
48%
40%
8%
11%
7%
Non-supervisors  
consider this more  
efficient than  
supervisors
Improving lighting 48% 44% 8%
Improving ergonomics or usability
supervisors
non-supervisors
43%
37%
46%
51%
44%
53%
6%
8%
6%
Non-supervisors  
consider this more  
efficient than  
supervisors
Revising the safe work practices
supervisors
non-supervisors
42%
52%
39%
51%
44%
53%
7%
4%
8%
Non-supervisors  
consider this more  
efficient than  
supervisors
Increasing the competence of  
supervisors
38% 49% 13%
Decreasing workload
supervisors
non-supervisors
38%
28%
41%
49%
52%
48%
13%
21%
11%
Non-supervisors  
consider this more  
efficient than  
supervisors
Increasing safety training 34% 56% 10%
Developing instructions 32% 58% 10%
Better work clothing or outfits
supervisors
non-supervisors
31%
28%
41%
49%
55%
48%
20%
23%
18%
Non-supervisors  
consider this more  
efficient than  
supervisors
Reducing noise 28% 51% 22%
Decreasing overwork
supervisors
non-supervisors
20%
12%
22%
43%
46%
42%
38%
43%
36%
Non-supervisors 
consider this more  
efficient than super-
visors
Using checklists 19% 59% 22%
Improving working shift arrangements
supervisors
non-supervisors
17%
9%
19%
51%
50%
52%
32%
43%
36%
Non-supervisors  
consider this more 
efficient than  
supervisors
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The supervisors seem to focus on attitude and climate while non-supervisors point 
out concrete issues such as better tools/machines/equipment or improving ergo-
nomics or usability. In addition, 41% of the non-supervisors considered decreasing 
the workload a very efficient way to improve safety at work, but among supervisors, 
the corresponding number was only 28%.
7.6 Experiencing an accident in one’s vicinity increases mistrust 
in safety as a value of the organization
We analyzed the relations between the experience of a serious accident involving a 
co-worker or subordinate at some point and experienced perceptions of safety as a 
value in the organization, work-related values, and personal values (Table 7.7)
Table 7.7 Binary regression analysis for relations between an experienced accident in one’s vicinity and 
safety perceptions.
Experience of serious accidents in vicinity and safety perceptions
Reference category 2 (RR=1) 
Respondents with experience of accident in vicinity: 28%
*RR 95% CI p-value
Problems in warning signs 1.23 1.12-1.35 p<0.001
Supervisors ignoring safety 1.18 1.10-1.28 p<0.001
Safety is not the management’s priority 1.15 1.05-1.27 p=0.004
Misperception of relevant information 1.15 1.04-1.29 p=0.009
Acting safely is not supported in everyday work 1.14 1.03-1.27 p=0.016
Safety is ignored at the work-group level 1.14 1.02-1.28 p=0.021
Achievement 0.91 0.83-0.99 p=0.031
Safety personnel is active 0.91 0.83-1.00 p=0.043
Prestige work values 0.89 0.80-0.99 p=0.038
Supervisors showing their responsibility 0.89 0.81-0.99 p=0.035
The management participates and involves employees) 0.85 0.77-0.94 p<0.001
Supervisors showing a good example and encouraging  
employees in safety matters
0.85 0.76-0.96 p=0.008
The organization has an extensive interest in safety 0.84 0.76-0.93 p<0.001
The organization values safety in order to pursue positive outcomes 0.81 0.71-0.93 p=0.002
Acting safely is valued in the work community 0.8 0.71-0.90 p<0.001
*)Model adjusted for age, sex and education
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We discovered that people whose co-worker or subordinate has had a serious acci-
dent at some point tend to be more critical on issues related to the work environment 
as well as to the safety values of management, supervisors, safety personnel and em-
ployees. For example, they were more likely to feel that supervisors are ignoring safe-
ty and that safety is not a priority for the management. They also tend to consider 
that safety is ignored at the work-group level. Further, they identified more problems 
with warnings and misperceptions of relevant information. Again, they were less like-
ly to feel that safety personnel were active or to view supervisors as demonstrating 
responsibility or a good example. 
In addition, they were less likely to feel that their organization had an extensive 
interest in safety or that it valued safety for positive goals. Concerning personal 
and work-related values, people who had experienced a serious accident involving 
co-worker/subordinate put less weight on achievements in personal life and pres-
tige work values. This is a logical result, since the accident experienced in their vicini-
ty has probably revealed several deficiencies regarding safety and therefore fed their 
mistrust in safety as a value of the organization.
7.7 Factors predicting that safety is valued by individuals
In our analysis, we used regression analyses and regression tree analyses to iden-
tify the factors predicting that safety is not valued by certain individuals. Using the 
regression analysis (Table 7.8), it was found that Problems in management’s safety 
communication, Safety not supported in everyday work, Organization valuing safety 
to avoid negative outcomes, Safety not being management’s priority, Problems with 
warnings, and Usefulness of safety training explain a significant amount of the vari-
ance in the value of safety not being recognized by individuals (F (22.61) = 4.63, p < 
.01, R2 = .44, R2Adjusted = .42).
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Table 7.8 Regression Tree for Predicting ‘The importance of the value of safety is not recognized by indivi-
duals’. (5-point Likert scale, where 1=fully disagree and 5=fully agree)
Regression analysis predicting “The importance of the 
value of safety is not recognized by individuals”
B SE B BETA
Security .008 .019 .012
Conformity -.038 .020 -.062
Tradition .044 .019 .067
Benevolence -.065 .026 -.084
Universalism -.055 .025 -.077
Self-direction -.022 .021 -.033
Stimulation .006 .019 .009
Hedonism -.002 .018 -.003
Achievement .022 .020 .039
Power .028 .023 .043
Extrinsic work values -.075 .029 -.072
Intrinsic work values -.041 .031 -.045
Social work values -.052 .031 -.061
Prestige work values .041 .028 .052
Excessive workload or time pressure .002 .019 .003
Lack of knowledge or information & Problems in  
communication
.056 .022 .082
Problems in warning signs -.118 .022 -.165 a
Management’s safety communication is open and active -.139 .034 -.150 a
Supervisors showing their responsibility .049 .033 .060
Safety training is useful .073 .027 .087 b
Acting safely is not supported in everyday work .247 .029 .307 a
Safety is not the management’s priority .113 .026 .172 a
Organization values safety to avoid negative outcomes .051 .019 .071 b
Organization values safety to pursue positive outcomes -.107 .036 -.108
Organization has an extensive interest on safety -.012 .037 -.014
Safety deviations are handled actively -.041 .032 -.045
Supervisors ignoring safety .029 .021 .049
Management participates and involves employees .073 .027 .098 b
Supervisors showing a good example and encouraging 
employees in safety matters
.017 .041 .019
Safety personnel is active -.055 .024 -.077
Memory .036 .025 .047
Difficulty in prioritizing and decision-making -.012 .022 -.020
Misperception of relevant information -.006 .027 -.007
a: p<0.001 b: p<0.01
93
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
Furthermore, we predicted ’The Importance of valuing safety is not recognized by in-
dividuals’ using individual items from the PVQ, WVS, SUJUVA scales, as well as SV1-
SV4, using regression tree analysis Figure 7.15). The model was least-squares regres-
sion tree (pseudo R-squared = 0.24), selected using standard techniques (250-fold 
cross-validation, 1-SE rule).
Figure 7.15 Regression Tree for Predicting ‘The importance of the value of safety is not recognized by 
individuals’. (5-point Likert scale, where 1=fully disagree and 5=fully agree)
Based on the regression tree, the most significant items predicting that the impor-
tance of valuing safety is not recognized by individuals were:
• Supervisors do not encourage safe work
• We workers consider minor accidents a normal part of our daily work
• The management’s safety solutions are not suitable for everyday work
• In some practical situations, it is not possible to follow safety instructions
If the respondent feels that supervisors do not encourage safe work, the probabili-
ty that he or she will ignore safety as a value increases if the respondent has a con-
ception that minor accidents are a normal part of his/her work, and even more so if 
the respondent also feels that the management’s safety solutions are not suitable for 
everyday work. Even if a respondent feels that supervisors do encourage safe work, 
the risk for the individual not valuing safety increases if the respondent feels that fol-
lowing safety instructions is not possible in some situations.
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8 SAFETY AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL VALUE – THE 
MAIN CHALLENGES AND PROPOSALS FOR 
SOLUTIONS
8.1 Beyond safety as an employee’s value
Values can be described as beliefs regarding what is important and core conceptions 
of what is desirable or acceptable (e.g. Rokeach 2000; Colley et al. 2013; Meglino and 
Ravlin 1998). Although safety is often considered a core value, this study showed that 
the motivation for safety still lies in avoiding negative outcomes, i.e. financial sanctions. 
Most of the survey participants agreed that they are committed to working safely and 
that acting safely is valued in their work community. The most highly scored personal 
value was occupational safety, and there was no significant difference between work-
ers and management. However, at all points, respondents in non-supervisory position 
gave more negative scores concerning how safety is valued in their organization. When 
asked about the values in everyday work and decision-making, the top three items in 
supervisors’ minds were occupational safety, productivity, and cost efficiency, but the 
experiences of non-supervisors were that occupational safety is overtaken by produc-
tivity and cost efficiency. The results show that the extrinsic work values were consid-
ered most important and the prestige work values least important.
As regards valuing safety, there is a tendency to think – wrongly – that an individual’s 
unsafe behaviour results mostly from his/her bad personal values and attitudes con-
cerning safety. Instead, we need to understand that most of the safety behavior at 
work results from how people experience that safety is (or is not) valued, communi-
cated, rewarded, directed, demanded and managed in their organization. For exam-
ple, based on previous value research and safety climate studies, there are several or-
ganizational issues affecting how individuals value and prioritize safety in their work:
• The safety climate – referring here to the perceptions of how safety is val-
ued and managed in the organization – affects the safety behavior of peo-
ple. (Clarke 2006a, b)
• If managers and supervisors are not consistent with their actions and com-
munications concerning priorities, employees cannot be sure what is expect-
ed from them. (Colley and Neal 2012)
• If there is a lack of clarity regarding the importance of safety compared to 
other values (e.g. working safely vs. completing work as fast as possible), or 
if the organization’s reward systems are mostly based on factors other than 
safety measures, it soon leads to employees valuing other things more than 
safety. (Meglino and Ravlin 1998)
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• Employees’ trust and mistrust towards management have been identified as 
the strongest influence on safety performance. (Conchie and Donald 2006)
Our value survey confirm that employees’ values regarding safety are mainly influ-
enced by organizational and managerial factors. This study revealed the importance 
of safety communication and the role of supervisors in encouraging safe work, and 
the interviews support these results. The factors are quite practical: how safety and 
the value thereof are communicated and prioritized by supervisors and management 
in everyday work, and how working safely is enabled in practical situations. An ad-
ditional finding is that the value of safety decreases among employees if they feel 
that employer does not genuinely value the safety of employees and is just trying to 
avoid sanctions. Meanwhile, employees consider near misses and minor accidents to 
be part of their work. This may also be seen as a result of organizational and mana-
gerial values and priorities regarding safety.
Some of the most essential safety-related problems were safety communication and 
inapplicable safety instructions. The results also show that the most typical human er-
rors and straining work conditions were difficulties in prioritizing and decision-mak-
ing, excessive workload or time pressure, which can be considered weak signals for 
safety problems. 
Our results show that when it comes to improving safety, supervisors and managers 
tend to focus on the safety climate and attitude, while workers focus more on con-
crete barriers to safety in everyday work. This kind of difference is typical between 
workers and supervisors, but it can be also a sign that the motivations and back-
grounds behind unsafe behaviour are not understood by supervisors. In addition, 
the non-supervisors considered time pressure and workload issues more problem-
atic than the supervisors. 
8.2 How to strengthen safety as a value?
Quite often, organizations ask for tools for improving the safety attitudes of their 
employees. However, that should be the last step, after ensuring that all the prereq-
uisites are on the rails. 
Values the organization wishes to acknowledge can be conveyed through organi-
zational socialization, when leaders themselves set and implement the values of the 
organization and propagate them to employees (Meglino and Ravlin 1998). This re-
quires that safety as a value be communicated openly, systematically and on a regu-
lar basis, and the values must be presented as the only possible interpretation of the 
situation (Meglino and Ravlin 1998).
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The aim should be an organizational state of mind in which working safely is seen as 
the only possible and acceptable way of working. Strengthening safety as a value re-
quires co-operation on safety issues between management and employees. Based 
on our study, different managerial practices can be recommended in order to man-
age and promote safety as an organizational value.
Defining the core values of an organization should start by analyzing the current val-
ues directing the operations. Next, the values and value priorities that the organi-
zation wishes to implement should be discussed in cooperation with management 
and employees, in order to improve the mutual understanding and commitment of 
all the personnel. If employees are asked to work safely, safety should also be one 
of the core values. The management should make sure it is possible and acceptable, 
even desired, in every day work. As we have described, a great deal of safety behav-
iour results from the safety-related experiences employees have at their workplace. 
It is useful to figure out what perceptions employees and supervisors have regarding 
safety and its value at work, and to identify the issues preventing people from valu-
ing and prioritizing safety at work.
To communicate safety as a value, one of the most important things is for top man-
agement to ensure adequate resources (time, people, equipment, competence) for 
safe work. The employer should also be rewarding both employees and supervisors 
for safety as much as for production objectives, in order to emphasize the impor-
tance of safety. 
There should be several practices in place to increase positive safety communication 
along with everyday work between the supervisor and employees, as well as between 
supervisors and management. Even top management should be visible for employ-
ees on safety issues on a regular basis, e.g. by visiting work sites and actively asking 
for and listening to employees’ opinions and suggestions. 
The top management should ensure that supervisors are trained to communicate 
safety matters in the right way in everyday work. There is a huge difference between 
saying to an employee, “you must get this work finished as soon as possible” com-
pared to “even though we are on a tight schedule, there is no need to risk your safe-
ty”. It is often more about the perceptions and experiences people have regarding 
the management’s safety values, not always just facts.
In a processing industry company, the management has decided to invest on new 
expensive production line. The most important specifications for the new produc-
tion line were its safety and usability for the workers, manufacturing efficiency, and 
easier maintenance. However, when communicating the investment to employees, 
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the main message was that of the employer making a large investment in manu-
facturing efficiency, even though the safety issues were the top criteria. As a result, 
the workers felt that their employer was hardly valuing safety. It was not about the 
facts but the experience. The management had a good intention but the commu-
nication was defective.
The management should make good use of participative safety development where 
employees act as experts concerning their work, and ask for employees’ opinions 
even then when beginning to plan changes to processes or new machinery invest-
ments. Participative practices improve both the quality and applicability of instruc-
tions as well as the commitment of the employees, and prevent the problem demon-
strated also in our study, when employees felt that following the safety instructions 
was impossible in some practical situations. In addition, the aspect of human cogni-
tive abilities and limitations should be taken into account when planning work and 
designing work environments.
Since both supervisors and non-supervisors felt that customers or partners do not 
understand what safe work requires, and this might be one of the reasons for unnec-
essarily tight schedules, top management should also communicate regarding these 
issues with their interest groups.
Middle managers play key roles in interpreting strategic values in terms of employ-
ees’ values and employees’ everyday work responsibilities, as well as communicating 
and rewarding performance toward those values. The middle managers act as inte-
grators, connecting employees’ individual values, derived from their societal, cultural, 
and religious experiences, with the organization’s strategic practices. (Paarlberg and 
Perry 2007.) It is important for middle managers to ensure that supervisors under-
stand and agree with their subordinates on the value of safety. It is beneficial for mid-
dle managers to participate in the safety meetings and discuss safety-related matters 
directly with the employees. They should also monitor that the appointed safety pro-
cedures (e.g. safety observations, toolbox meetings) are being put into practice by 
supervisors. If there are any inadequacies, the middle manager should step in and en-
sure that the competence and resources needed for these procedures are available.
Supervisors are the link between the employer and employees, and their actions and 
talk are everyday communication of the value of safety. Supervisors should show a 
good example and monitor that employees are following the safety instructions. If 
any unsafe behavior arises, they should intervene systematically. When intervening, 
it is important to determine the circumstances and reasons for unsafe behavior, for 
example by exploiting the rule-breaking analysis from HERA-JANUS (Isaac, Shorrock, 
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Kennedy, Kirwan, Anderson & Bove, 2003): Was there an intent to break a rule; was 
the person aware of the rule; were the procedures understood and applicable; was it 
a common way of working; were there some competing values/goals against safety. 
Most people have good intentions to fulfil the expectations they are facing, but of-
ten there are practical reasons, value or goal conflicts, and problems in prioritization, 
which will lead to unsafe behavior. Of course, there might be a small minority of peo-
ple intentionally neglecting the instructions and rules, and, therefore, sanctions are 
also necessary in some cases. 
As regards risk perceptions, people are quite incapable of estimating the risks. It is 
known that people tend to overestimate their own abilities, and especially if they 
have not faced any accidents, their perceptions of risks might become even more dis-
torted. Our results show that experiencing an accident in one’s vicinity increases one’s 
criticality towards safety practices, which might be partly because of the increased 
awareness regarding safety risks. In our study, we also discovered that many of the 
respondents considered minor accidents a normal part of daily work, which can be 
seen as a sign of distorted perceptions of risks and safety. Supervisors and workers 
should discuss what is actually normal in one’s work. Of course, the employer should 
state that accidents are not part of normal work. 
To improve the competence of employees in identifying work-related risks, envision-
ing training might be useful. By discussing the accident and near-miss reports from 
one’s own workplace as well as other departments or companies, envisioning the dif-
ferent possible scenarios and determining preventive actions, people are trained to 
better understand the causalities behind accidents. The methods used in the analy-
sis should include elements that also help to identify the real factors behind the un-
safe behavior (see Kalakoski et al. 2015).
8.3 Limitations
The number of organizations in our study is small, and therefore the results cannot 
be generalized to the entire working population. However, our data represented dif-
ferent industries and organizational groups and we consider the results to represent 
the phenomenon of safety as an organizational value quite well. 
8.4 For future research
Based on our research, we feel there is a need for further study regarding the val-
ue-forming mechanisms in organizations. We also suggest a pilot study to develop 
and test the “safety as an organizational value” socialization process. 
99
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
LITERATURE
Alli, B.O. (2008). Fundamental principles of occupational health and safety. Geneva 
(Switzerland): International Labour Organisation. 221p.
Amalberti R. (2015), Values/behaviour: cause or consequence?, Tribunes de la sécu-
rité industrielle, 2015 , 4, pp. 1–3, FONCSI. 
Aupperle, K.E., Carroll, A.B. & Hatfield, J.D. (1985). An empirical investigation of the re-
lationship between corporate social responsibility and profitability. Academy of Man-
agement Journal 28, 446–463. 
British Quality Foundation (BQF). (2016). Glossary of EFQM Excellence Model terms 
[Internet] [cited 2016 Feb 26]. Available from: http://services.bqf.org.uk/efqm-excel-
lence-model/glossary-terms
Buccini, L.D., Jones, C., Iverson, D., & Caputi, P. (2009). Toward a construct definition of informed 
consent comprehension. Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics, 4(1), 17–23.
Buytendijk, F. (2010) Dealing with dilemmas. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 220 p. 
Cambridge Dictionaries Online. (2016). http://dictionary.cambridge.org/
Cambridge Leadership Development. (2013). Quadruple Bottom Line for Sustaina-
ble Prosperity. Available from: http://cambridgeleadershipdevelopment.com/quad-
ruple-bottom-line-for-sustainable-prosperity/. [29 February 2016].
Carroll, A.B. (1979) A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate social perfor-
mance. Academy of Management Review 4, 497–505. 
Carroll, A.B. (1983). Corporate social responsibility: Will industry respond to cutbacks 
in social program funding? Vital Speeches of the Day 49, July 15, 604–608. 
Carroll, A.B. (1991). The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the moral 
management of organizational stakeholders. Business Horizons 34, July/August, 39–48.
Carroll, A.B. (1999) Corporate social responsibility. Evolution of a definitional con-
struct. Business & Society 38, 3, 268–295. 
Carroll, A.B. (2015). Corporate social responsibility: The centerpiece of competing and 
complementary frameworks. Organizational Dynamics 44, 87–96. 
Clarke S. (2006a). The relationship between safety climate and safety performance: a 
meta-analytic review. Journal of occupational health psychology, 11(4), 315-327. DOI: 
10.1037/1076-8998.11.4.315
100
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
Clarke, S. (2006b). Contrasting perceptual, attitudinal and dispositional approaches to 
accident involvement in the workplace. Safety Science, 44(6), 537-550. DOI: 10.1016/j.
ssci.2005.12.001
Cochran, P.L. & Wood, R.A. (1984). Corporate social responsibility and financial per-
formance. Academy of Management Journal 27, 42–56.
Colley, S. & Neal, A. (2012). Automated text analysis to examine qualitative differenc-
es in safety schema among upper managers, supervisors and workers. Safety Science 
50, 1775–1785. DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2012.04.006.
Colley, S.K., Lincolne, J. & Neal, A. (2013). An examination of the relationship amongst 
profiles of perceived organizational values, safety climate and safety outcomes. Safe-
ty Science 51, 69–76. DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2012.06.001.
Collin, P. (2009). Dictionary of Business. Retrieved from http://www.eblib.com
Conchie, S.M. & Donald, I.J. (2006). The role of distrust in offshore safety performance. 
Risk Analysis, 26 (5), 1151–1159. DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2006.00822.x.
Cooper, D. (2001). Treating safety as a value. Professional Safety, February, 17–21.
Corporate social responsibility. (2016). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Avail-
able:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_social_responsibility. [March 1 2016].
Crowe, J.W. (1995). Safety values and safe practices among college students. Journal 
of Safety Research 56, 187–195.
Davis, K. (1973). The case for and against business assumption of social responsibil-
ities. Academy of Management Journal 16, 312–322. 
DeArmond, S., Huang, Y.-H., Chen, P.Y. & Courtney, T.K. (2010). Corporate financial 
decision makers’ perceptions of their company’s safety performance, programs, and 
personnel: Do company size and industry injury risk matter? Work 37, 3–13. 
Dekker, S. (2012). Just Culture, Balancing Safety and Accountability. 2nd edition, Al-
dershot: Ashgate Publishers. 171 p.
Díaz-Cabrera, D., Hernandez-Fernaud, E. & Isla-Díaz, R. (2007). An evaluation of a new 
instrument to measure organisational safety culture values and practices. Accident 
Analysis & Prevention 39, 6, 1202–1211.
Dierdorf, E.C. & Morgeson, F.P. (2013). Getting what the occupation gives: exploring multilev-
el links between work design and occupational values. Personnel Psychology, 66, 687–721.
Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending. Eu-
101
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
ropean Parliament and of the Council. 12 June 2013. Available at http://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32013L0030 (Visited 27.7.2015)
Du, S., Bhattacharya, C.B. & Sen, S. (2010). Maximizing business returns to corporate 
social responsibility (CSR): the role of CSR communication. International Journal of 
Management Reviews, 12, 8–19. 
Edwards, J.R.D., Davey, J. & Armstrong, K.(2013). Returning to the roots of culture: A 
review and re-conceptualisation of safety culture. Safety Science 55, 70–80.
Eilbert, H. & Parket, I.R. (1973). The current status of corporate social responsibility. 
Business Horizons 16, 5–14. 
English - English Dictionary. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.eblib.com
Epstein, E.M. (1987). The corporate social policy process: Beyond business ethics, cor-
porate social responsibility, and corporate social responsiveness. California Manage-
ment Review 29, 99–114.
Fitch, H.G. (1976). Achieving corporate social responsibility. Academy of Manage-
ment Review 1, 38–46. 
Fonseca, L.M. (2015). Strategic Drivers for Implementing Sustainability Programs in 
Portuguese Organizations–Let’s Listen to Aristotle: From Triple to Quadruple Bottom 
Line. Sustainability: The Journal of Record, 8(3): 136–142. doi:10.1089/SUS.2015.29004.
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Fu, Y.-K. & Chan, T.-L. (2014). A conceptual evaluation framework for organization-
al safety culture: An empirical study of Taipei Songshan Airport. Journal of Air Trans-
port Management 34, 101–108.
Giddens, A. (1991). The consequences of modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Giddens, A. (1991). The constitution of society. 5th ed. Cambridge (UK): Polity Press; 402p. 
Gregory, B.T., Harris, S.G., Armenakis, A.A. & Shook, C.L. (2009). Organizational culture 
and effectiveness: A study of values, attitudes, and organizational outcomes. Journal 
of Business Research 62, 673–679.
Griffin, M.A. & Neal, A. (2000). Perceptions of safety at work: A framework for linking 
safety climate to safety performance, knowledge, and motivation. Journal of Occu-
pational Health Psychology 5, 347–358.
Guldenmund, F.W. (2000). The nature of safety culture: a review of theory and re-
search. Safety Science 34, 215–257.
102
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
Gyekye, S.A. & Salminen, S. (2007). Workplace safety perceptions and perceived or-
ganizational support: Do supportive perceptions influence safety perceptions? Inter-
national Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics 13, 2, 189–200.
Gyekye, S.A. & Salminen, S. (2009a). Age and workers’ perceptions of workplace safe-
ty: A comparative study. International Journal of Aging and Human Development 68, 
2, 171–184.
Gyekye, S.A. & Salminen, S. (2009b). Educational status and organizational safety cli-
mate: Does educational attainment influence workers’ perceptions of workplace safe-
ty? Safety Science 47, 20–28.
Gyekye, S.A., Salminen, S. & Ojajärvi, A. (2012). A theoretical model to ascertain de-
terminates of occupational accidents among Ghanaian industrial workers. Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 42, 233–240.
Halbesleben, J., Leroy, H., Dierynck, B., Simons, T., Savage, G. & McCaughey, D. (2013). 
Living Up to Safety Values in Health Care: The Effect of Leader Behavioral Integrity 
on Occupational Safety. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology 18, 4, 395–405.
Henderson, D. (2001). Misguided virtue: False notions of corporate social responsi-
bility. London: The Institute of Economic Affairs. 
Henriques, A. (2013). CSR, sustainability and the triple bottom line, pp. 26–33 in Hen-
riques, A. & Richardson, J. (2013). Triple Bottom Line : Does It All Add Up, e-book, ac-
cessed 29 February 2016, <http://ttl.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=430036>.
Higgins, E.T. (2002). How self-regulation creates distinct values: the case of promo-
tion and prevention decision making. Journal of Consumer Psychology 12, 177–191.
Hofstede, G., Hostede, G.J. & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and organizations: software 
of the mind. 3rd ed. New York (NY): McGraw – Hill. 560p.
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D.D. & Leveson, N.(eds.) (2006). Resilience engineering. Alder-
shot: Ashgate. 
Holme, R. & Watts, P. (2000). Corporate social responsibility: making good business 
sense. World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). Available: 
http://www.wbcsd.org/web/publications/csr2000.pdf
Hsu, C.-C., & Sandford, B.A. (2007). The Delphi technique: Making sense of consensus. 
Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, 12(10). Available online: http://pareon-
line.net/getvn.asp?v=12&n=10.
Hystad, S.W. & Bye, H.H. (2013) Safety behaviors at sea: The role of personal values 
103
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
and personality hardiness. Safety Science 57, 19–26.
IAEA (2009). The management system for nuclear installations. Vienna. Available 
at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1392_web.pdf (Visited 
27.7.2015)
IAEA (2015) Safety culture. http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operational-safety/
safety-culture-home.asp. Downloaded 7.9.2015
Inayatullah, S. (2005). Spirituality as the fourth bottom line? Futures 37(6):573–579. 
Isaac, A., Shorrock, S.T., Kennedy, R., Kirwan, B., Anderson, H. and Bove, T. (2003). The 
Human Error in ATM Technique (HERA-JANUS). EUROCONTROL EATMP Report HRS/
HSP-002-REP-03 Edition 1. Brussels: EUROCONTROL. 
Jamali, D. & Mirshak, R. (2007). Corporate social responsibility (CSR): theory and prac-
tice in a developing country context. Journal of Business Ethics 72, 243–262. 
Johnson, H.L. (1971). Business in contemporary society: framework and issues. Bel-
mont, CA: Wadsworth.
Jones, T.M. (1980). Corporate social responsibility revisited, redefined. California Man-
agement Review, Spring, 59–67.
Kalakoski, V., Ratilainen, H., Lukander J., and Salminen S. (2012). Cognitive failure at 
work: factorial structure of a new questionnaire. ECCE 2012: 177-180
Kalakoski, V., Ratilainen, H., Puro, V., Perttula, P., Salminen, S., Lukander, J., Mattila, S., 
Leskinen, T., Mäkelä, T., and Plaketti, P. (2015). Sujuvaa työtä, vähemmän virheitä – In-
himillisten virheiden vähentäminen työpaikoilla (SUJUVA) [Better work flow, less er-
rors: Decreasing human errors at work, the SUJUVA project]. Työterveyslaitos, Helsin-
ki. ISBN 978-952-261-542-8. 60 p.
Karr, A. (1999). The CEO difference. Safety+Health, June, 74–79.
Keller, L.M., Bouchard, T.J., Arvey, R.D., Segal, N.L. & Davis, R.V. (1992). Work values: 
Genetic and environmental influences. Journal of Applied Psychology 77, 1, 79–88.
Kritsotakis, G., Vassilaki, M., Chatzi, L., Georgiou, V., Philalithis, A.E., Kogevinas, M. & 
Koutis, A. (2011). Maternal social capital and birth outcomes in the mother-child co-
hort in Crete, Greece (Rhea study). Social Science & Medicine 73, 1653–1660.
Lai, D.N.C., Liu, M. & Ling, F.Y.Y. (2011). A comparative study on adopting human re-
source practices for safety management on construction projects in the United States 
and Singapore. International Journal of Project Management 29, 1018–1032.  
104
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
Lawler, E.E. (2014). The Quadruple Bottom Line: Its Time Has Come. Available from: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardlawler/2014/05/07/the-quadruple-bottom-
line-its-time-has-come/#75e72e836630 . [29 February 2016].
Maon, F., Lindgreen, A. & Swaen, V. (2010). Organizational stages and cultural phas-
es: A critical review and a consolidative model of corporate social responsibility de-
velopment. International Journal of Management Reviews, 12, 20–38. 
Martino, J.P. (1972). Technological forecasting for decision making (3rd edition). 
McGraw-Hill, Inc.
McKinsey 7S Framework. (2016). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Availa-
ble: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=McKinsey_7S_Framework&ol-
did=702064529. [March 1 2016].
McWilliams, A. & Siegel, D. (2000). Corporate social responsibility and financial perfor-
mance: correlation or misspecification? Strategic Management Journal 21, 603–609. 
Meglino, B.M. & Ravlin, E.C. (1998). Individual values in organizations: Concepts, con-
troversies, and research. Journal of Management 24, 351–389. DOI: 10.1016/S0149-
2063(99)80065-8.
Merrick J.R.W., Grabowski, M., Ayyalasomayajula, P. & Harrald, J.R. (2005). Understand-
ing organizational safety using value-focused thinking. Risk Analysis, 25(4), 1029–1041.
Neal, A., Griffin, M.A. & Hart, P.M. (2000). The impact of organizational climate on 
safety climate and individual behavior. Safety Science 34, 99–109.
Newman, S., Griffin, M. & Mason, S. (2008). Safety in Work Vehicles: A Multilevel 
Study Linking Safety Values and Individual Predictors to Work-Related Driving Crash-
es. Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 93 (3), pp. 632–644
Newman, S., Lewis, I. & Watson, B. (2012). Occupational driver safety: Conceptualiz-
ing a leadership-based intervention to improve safe driving performance. Accident 
Analysis and Prevention 45, 29–38.
Paarlberg, L. E. and Perry, J. L. (2007). Values management: Aligning employee val-
ues and organization goals. American Review of Public Administration, 37(4). DOI: 
10.1177/0275074006297238.
Peters, T.J. & Waterman, R.H. (1982). In search of excellence: lessons from America’s 
best-run companies. New York: Harper & Row.
Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk modelling in a dynamic society: a modelling problem. Safe-
ty Science, 27 (2/3), 183–213.
105
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
Ratilainen, H. (ed.), Salminen, S., Zwetsloot, G., Perttula, P., Starren, A., Steijn, W., Pah-
kin, K., Drupsteen, L., Puro, V., Räsänen, T., Aaltonen, M., Berkers, F., and Kalakoski, V. 
(2016). The value of safety and safety as a value. SAF€RA technical report, number 
2016-01. Available at projects.safera.eu.
Reason, J.T. (1997). Managing the risks of organisational accidents. Aldershot: Ash-
gate. 252 p.
Reiman, T., Pietikäinen, E. & Oedewald P. (2008. Turvallisuuskulttuuri: Teoria ja arvio-
inti. [Safety culture: Theory and evaluation] Espoo, VTT Publications 700, 106 s.
Robinson, P., Oades, L. G., & Caputi, P. (2015). Conceptualising and measuring mental 
fitness: A Delphi study. International Journal of Wellbeing, 5(1), 53–73.
Rokeach, M. (2000). Understanding Human Values. Free Press, New York. 322 p. IS-
BN: 978-0743214568.
Ros M., Schwartz S. H. & Surkiss S. (1999). Basic Individual Values, Work Values and 
the Meaning of Work. Applied Psychology: An International Review, January 1999, 
pp. 58–9.
Saleh, J.H. & Pendley, C.C. (2012). From learning from accidents to teaching about 
accident causation and prevention: Multidisciplinary education and safety literacy 
for all engineering students. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 99, 105–113.
Salminen, S. & Koivula, N. (2006). Personal values in a Finnish steel company. In: K.L. 
Saarela, C.-H. Nygård & S. Lusa (Eds.): Promotion of well-being in modern society. 
38th annual congress of the Nordic Ergonomics Society, 24–27 September 2006 in 
Hämeenlinna, Finland. Pk-paino oy, Tampere, 91–93.  
Salminen, S., Gyekye, S.A. & Ojajärvi, A. (2013). Individual and organizational factors 
of safe behavior among Ghanaian industrial workers. Engineering Management Re-
search 2, 98–110.  
Schein, E. (1996). Three Cultures of Management: The Key to Organizational Learn-
ing. Sloan Management Review, 38, 1, 9–20.
Schein, E. (1997). Conceptual model for managed culture change. In: Schein, E. (ed.) 
Organisational culture and leadership. 2nd ed. San Francisco (CA): Jossey-Bass. 406p.
Schein, E. (2007). Can learning cultures evolve? In: The new workplace: transforming the char-
acter and culture of four organizations. Waltham (MA): Pegasus Communications.  59–68.
Schein, E. (2014). National and Occupational Culture Factors in Safety Culture. Revised 
Draft for IAEA meeting, April 9, 2014.
106
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
Schein, E.H. (2010). Organizational Culture and Leadership, 4th Ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: theoretical 
Advances and Tests in 20 Countries. Advances in Social Psychology, vol. 25, ed. M. 
Zanna (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1992), 1–65.
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of 
Human Values? Journal of Social Issues, Winter 1994, 19–45.
Schwartz, S. H. and Bilsky W. (1990). Toward a theory of the Universal Content and 
Structure of Values: Extensions and Cross-Cultural Replications’, Journal of Personal-
ity and Social Psychology, May 1990, 878–91.
Schwartz, S. H. and Bilsky, W. (1987). Toward a Universal Psychological Structure of Hu-
man Values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, September 1987, 550–62.
Schwartz, S. H. and Sagiv, L. (1995). Identifying Culture-Specifics in the Content and 
Structure of Values. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, January 1995, 92–116.
Schwartz, S. H., Melech, G., Lehmann, A., Burgess, S., & Harris, M. (2001). Extend-
ing the cross-cultural validity of the theory of basic human values with a different 
method of measurement. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32, 519-542. DOI: 
10.1177/0022022101032005001.
Schwartz, S.H. (2012). An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values. Online 
Readings in Psychology and Culture, 2(1). 
Shamir, R. (2011). Socially responsible private regulation: World-culture or world-cap-
italism? Law & Society Review 45, 2, 313–336.
Sinclair, R., Martin, J. & Sears, L. (2010). Labor unions and safety climate: Perceived union safety 
values and retail employee safety outcomes. Accident Analysis and Prevention 42, 1477–1487.
Smallman, C. & John, G. (2001). British directors’ perspectives on the impact of health 
and safety on corporate performance. Safety Science 38, 227–239.
Snowden, D (2000). Cynefin: a sense of time and space: the social ecology of knowl-
edge management. In Despres, C. & Chauvel, D. (eds.), Knowledge Horizons: The 
Present and the Promise of Knowledge Management, 237–266, Butterworth-Heine-
mann: Oxford.
The Robert W. Campbell Award. (2015). Recognizing Business Excellence in Safety and 
Health. The Campbell Institute 2015. Available at www.campbellaward.org. [28 July 2015].
The Values-Based Business. (2014). Compassion as the fourth bottom line?. Available: 
http://valuesbased.biz/2014/08/10/compassion/. [29 February 2016].
107
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
Townsend, A.S. (2013). Exploring large organizations – to fear or not to fear? Farnham: Gover.
Ullmann, A.A. (1985). Data in search of a theory: a critical examination of the rela-
tionships among social performance, social disclosure, and economic performance 
of U.S. firms. Academy of Management Review 10, 540–557. 
US OSHA (2012). White paper on Injury and Illness Prevention Programs. Available at https://
www.osha.gov/dsg/InjuryIllnessPreventionProgramsWhitePaper.html [27 July 2015].
Van Scheppingen, A.R., ten Have, K.C.J.M., Zwetsloot, G.J.I.M., Kok, G., & van Mechel-
en, W. (2015). Determining organisation-specific factors for developing health inter-
ventions in companies by a Delphi procedure: Organisational mapping. Journal of 
Health Psychology, 20 (12), 1509–1522.
Waddock, S.A. & Graves, S.B. (1997). The corporate social performance – financial 
performance link. Strategic Management Journal 18, 4, 303–319.  
Walton, C.C. (1967). Corporate social responsibilities. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.  
Wood, D.J. (1991). Corporate social performance revisited. Academy of Management 
Review 16, 691–718. 
Yousuf, M.I. (2007). Using experts’ opinions through Delphi technique. Practical Assessment, 
Research & Evaluation, 12(4). Available online: http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=12&n=4.
Zwetsloot, G. (2003). From management systems to corporate social responsibility. 
Journal of Business Ethics 44 (2–3): 201–207.
Zwetsloot, G., Aaltonen, M., Wybo, J.-L., Saari, J., Kines, P. & Op De Beeck, R. (2013). 
The case for research into the zero accident vision. Safety Science 58, 41–48. Availa-
ble at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2013.01.026 (Visited 27.7.2015)
Zwetsloot, G.I.J.M. & Starren, A. (eds.) (2004). Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Safety and Health at Work, Research Report from the European Agency for Safety 
and Health at Work, Issue 210, Bilbao, 131 p.
Zwetsloot, G.I.J.M., van Scheppingen, A.R., Bos, E.H., Dijkman, A. & Starren, A. (2013). 
The core values that support health, safety, and well-being at work. Safety and Health 
at Work 4, 187–196.
108
Value of Safety (VALOSA)
Many companies describe safety as their top priority, but does that mean 
that safety is a value for them? Values are more stable and can be expected 
to have a more sustainable impact on safety than safety as “just a priority”. 
Particularly in an era of deregulation, globalization, economic downturn and 
the ‘changing world of work’, values and culture are more stable than mana-
gement systems or priorities.
There is often an imbalance between safety values and business values, 
leading to dilemmas and unsafe situations. By exploring safety values and 
dilemmas, this report provides insights into more successful mechanisms 
that have the potential to strengthen and promote safety values.
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